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I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities Act of 1933 is an important restriction on capital mar-
kets in the United States. Unless an exemption is available, the Act re-
quires companies selling securities to the public' first to file with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a registration statement
containing detailed information about the company, its business, its fi-
nances, and the contemplated offering.' Offers cannot be made (except to
underwriters) until the registration statement is filed,- and the securities
can be sold only after the registration statement survives the sometimes-
' Section 5 of the Securities Act, the key to the registration requirements, requires the use of
.$any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails." See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994). I shall assume throughout this Article that the requisite nexus
with interstate commerce exists.
I A number of different forms of registration statements are available. The forms available de-
pend on the type of issuer and on the type of offering. Form S-I is the most broadly available regis-
tration form and also the most comprehensive. Form S-1, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7121. Other
registration statement forms available to U.S. issuers include Form S-2, id. at 1 7141; Form S-3, id.
at 17151; Form S-4, id. at 7161; Form SB-I, id. at 7312; and Form SB-2, id. at S 7313. Some of
these forms allow the incorporation by reference of information in other SEC filings. See, e.g., Form
S-3, Item 12, id. at 7151.
For a detailed discussion of the contents of the registration statement and prospectus, see Louis
Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 599-742 (3d ed. 1989). See also 1 THOMAS
HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 94-103 (1990).
s Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 makes it unlawful
to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to
such security ....
15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994). The exception for offers to underwriters arises out of the statutory defini-
tions of "offer," "offer to sell," and "offer to buy," which exclude
preliminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer (or any person directly or indi-
rectly controlling or controlled by an issuer, or under direct or indirect common control
with an issuer) and any underwriter or among underwriters who are or are to be in privity
of contract with an issuer (or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by
an issuer, or under direct or indirect common control with an issuer).
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lengthy SEC review process and becomes effective.4 In addition, the secur-
ities seller must at some point furnish investors with a prospectus, which
contains much of the information in the registration statement.6
Economic analysis of the Securities Act, both theoretical and empirical,
has focused on the desirability of the registration requirement.6 Some
scholars have questioned whether the registration requirement is economi-
cally sound; others have argued that mandatory disclosure is necessary to
correct market failures in the securities markets.7
Lost in the debate on the economic merits of the registration require-
ment are the exemptions from that requirement-the offerings for which
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1994). For a more detailed, easily accessible
discussion of the registration process and the federal regulation of securities offerings, see MARC
STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 55-80 (1989). See also 1 HAZEN, supra note 2, at
56-125.
' Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, § 5(a) of the Securities Act makes it
unlawful
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in inter-
state commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any
means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for
delivery after sale.
15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1994).
" Until the registration statement becomes effective, the Securities Act restricts written communi-
cations with prospective purchasers. Section 5(b)(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (1994), makes
it unlawful to transmit any prospectus unless the prospectus meets the requirements of § 10 of the
Act. Section 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994), broadly defines "prospectus" to include any writing
offering a security for sale or confirming the sale of a security (with some exceptions). However, the
SEC has approved both preliminary and summary prospectuses as meeting the requirements of § 10
and therefore not prohibited by § 5(b)(1). Rule 430, 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (1995) (preliminary pro-
spectus); Rule 431, 17 C.F.R. § 230.431 (1995) (summary prospectus).
A final prospectus (the final, complete version of the prospectus contained in the registration state-
ment that becomes effective) must be sent to purchasers at the earlier of two times: (1) when a confir-
mation of the sale is mailed to the purchaser, or (2) when the security purchased is delivered to the
purchaser. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5(b), 2(10), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(b), 77b(10) (1994).
In the interest of brevity, I will refer to the registration and prospectus delivery requirements collec-
tively as the registration requirement.
e For theoretical discussions, see, e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECO-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 276-314 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and
the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). For empirical
analyses, see, e.g., George J. Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements,
44 Accr. REv. 515 (1969); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus.
117 (1964).
" For a brief introduction to this debate, see infra part HI.A.
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registration is not required. This Article fills the gap in the economic
analysis of the Securities Act by examining the economics of the exemp-
tions from registration. I will assume for the purpose of analysis that, in
at least some cases, the registration requirement is economically sound: its
benefits exceed its costs.8 I will then review the exemptions to see why
that conclusion might not hold for particular types of exempted offerings.
For the reader who believes the registration requirement is economically
efficient, my analysis of the exemptions will highlight offerings in which
that efficiency is less likely. For the reader who believes the registration
requirement is economically inefficient, my analysis of the exemptions will
highlight offerings for which the inefficiency is greatest.
I begin in Part II with a brief focus on the registration requirement
itself. Part II summarizes the economic debate concerning registration
and, as a prelude to an economic analysis of the exemptions, discusses the
costs and benefits of registration.
In Part III, I turn to the exemptions from registration and ask why, if
the benefits of registration generally exceed the costs, that might not be
true for these exempted offerings. The transaction exemptions are ex-
traordinarily different from each other. Some exemptions limit the dollar
amount of the offering; others limit the number or types of purchasers to
whom securities can be sold; others are contingent on oversight by some
authority other than the SEC. I show that the exemptions can be placed
into three categories, each with a slightly different economic justification.
After establishing an economic model for each type of exemption, I ex-
plore some of the requirements of the current exemptions to see if they are
economically sound. In Part IV, I focus on one particular feature of some
of the exemptions-limits on the number of purchasers in an offering.
Finally, in Part V, I examine an issue that has caused great difficulty
for scholars, practitioners, the courts, and the SEC: What should happen
when a single issuer makes two ostensibly separate, but roughly contem-
8 This approach has two justifications. The first justification is theoretical. The exemptions have
been ignored in the economic debate. The only sensible way to examine the exemptions is to assume
that registration is efficient for some offerings and ask why that might not be true for other offerings.
The second justification for this assumption is practical. The registration requirement of the Securities
Act of 1933 is unlikely to be repealed, even if its opponents' challenges are correct. The exemptions
are more likely to be modified. Focusing on the exemptions is therefore more likely to lead to produc-
tive change.
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poraneous offerings and claims a different exemption for each? In deter-
mining whether an exemption is available, should the offerings be com-
bined and treated as a single offering, or should their separation be
respected? I explore how well the integration doctrine and the safe-harbor
regulations that the SEC and the courts have developed to deal with this
problem fit the economic model.
II. THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
A. The Economics of Registration
From an economic perspective, the registration requirement of the Se-
curities Act is defensible only if the benefits of registration exceed the
costs. Letting B represent all of the benefits of registration and C all of the
costs, then registration is economically efficient only for offerings in which
B > C-in other words, only if registration produces a positive net bene-
fit.9 If it would cost $200,000 to register a particular offering of securities
and the information made available would only save investors $100, regis-
tration is inefficient. If, on the other hand, registration of the offering
would produce a $300,000 gain to investors and only cost $200,000, regis-
tration is economically efficient.
The practical problem, of course, is measuring the costs and benefits.
George Stigler initiated a heated debate in 1964 when he compared new
issues of common stock before and after the passage of the federal securi-
ties laws and concluded that "the SEC registration requirements had no
important effect on the quality of new securities sold to the public."'
Stigler concluded that "grave doubts exist whether if account is taken of
costs of regulation, the SEC has saved the purchasers of new issues one
dollar."11 Irwin Friend and Edward Herman promptly challenged both
Stigler's methodology and his interpretation of the data. 2 They found
9 Throughout this Article, I will use the term "net benefit" to refer to the difference, positive or
negative, between total benefits and total costs.
50 Stigler, supra note 6, at 124.
1 Stigler, supra note 6, at 124.
'2 Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382
(1964).
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"evidence of superior relative price performance of new issues in the post-
SEC period."' 3 Additional exchanges followed,14 and, in 1969, George
Benston produced additional analyses supporting Stigler's claim. 5 Ben-
ston's conclusions, like Stigler's, were promptly challenged.16 Other schol-
ars, such as Henry Manne"1 and Joel Seligman,1 8 have subsequently
joined the debate, either in support of or in opposition to the registration
requirement.
Critics of the registration requirement argue that firms have an incen-
tive to produce an efficient amount of information even in the absence of
the mandatory provisions in the Securities Act."9 If this is true, the federal
mandate merely increases the cost of offering securities, with little corre-
sponding benefit: C > B . On the other hand, supporters of the registra-
tion requirement argue that, due to various market failures, an unregu-
lated securities market would not produce the optimal amount of
13 Id. at 398.
", See Sidney Robbins & Walter Werner, Professor Stigler Revisited, 37 J. Bus. 406 (1964)
(criticizing Stigler's work); George J. Stigler, Comment, 37 J. Bus. 414 (1964) (recomputing his
original data and reaching the same conclusions); Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, Professor
Stigler on Securities Regulation: A Further Comment, 38 J. Bus. 106 (1965) (criticizing Stigler's
revised analysis). See also Irwin Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of Securities Mar-
ktds, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 185 (Henry G.
Manne ed., 1969) (restating Professor Friend's position).
"5 George J. Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Re-
quirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURrrIES, supra note
14, at 23; Benston, supra note 6.
" Morton Backer, Comments on "The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Require-
ments," 44 AcCT. REv. 533 (1969); Discussion and Questions From the Floor, in ECONOMIC POL-
ICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES, supra note 14, at 115-24.
" Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Laws,
in WALL STREET IN TRANSITION: THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 21
(Henry G. Manne & Ezra Solomon eds., 1974). Manne argues that Stigler's basic point-that the
Securities Act has not benefitted shareholders and investors-has not been refuted. Id. at 51.
"6 Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J.
CORP. L. 1 (1983). Professor Seligman uses historical research to argue that the mandatory disclosure
system has led to less concealment and misrepresentation, id. at 10-45, has reduced underwriters'
compensation, id. at 45-51, and has increased public confidence in the securities markets by reducing
risk, id. at 51-53. He also argues that no alternative mechanism could have ensured the optimal level
of corporate disclosure. Id. at 53-56.
" For a good discussion of the voluntary disclosure argument and its limitations, see EASTER-
BROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 288-92.
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disclosure. 2° As a result of these market failures, the benefits outweigh the
costs: B > C.
As indicated in Part I, I do not intend to join the general debate about
the efficiency of registration. My focus is on the exemptions. I assume for
the purpose of analysis that the supporters of the Securities Act are at
least partially correct: in some cases, the benefits of registration exceed the
costs (B > C). A. transaction should be exempted from registration only if,
for the particular transaction, the benefits of registration do not exceed the
costs (B < C). 21 The issue to be examined is why the net benefit of regis-
tering exempted offerings might differ from the net benefit for offerings
required to register. 2
B. The Costs and Benefits of Registration
What are the costs and benefits of registration? This question must be
answered before we can intelligently explore how those costs and benefits
differ in exempted offerings. Unfortunately, the available data, particu-
2' For discussions of the possible market failures associated with the market for new issues of
securities, see William H. Beaver, The Nature of Mandated Disclosure, in HOUSE COMM. ON IN-
TERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DIs-
CLOSURE TO THE SEC. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 618, 623-47 (1977); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 6, at 286-300; ROiERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 91-93 (1993);
Coffee, supra note 6, at 721-51; Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency
Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995).
" The SEC might decide whether to exempt offerings on a case-by-case basis. It could try to
calculate the costs and benefits of registration for each individual offering just before it is made and,
based on that calculation, decide whether to exempt it. The SEC has not chosen this approach. In-
stead, the exemptions are categorical. The SEC specifies in advance certain characteristics an offering
must have to be exempted. If an offering has these features, it is exempted. A categorical rule poses a
risk of both overinclusicn and underinclusion: some transactions within a category might be exempted
when they should not be (when B > C) and some transactions might be required to register when
they should not be (when B < C). See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 268 (1974). However, case-by-case determinations are
subject to the same types of error. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65, 73 (1983). And categorical rules could minimize both the SEC's decision-making costs
and the cost of uncertainty to issuers. See Diver, supra, at 73-74; Ehrlich & Posner, supra, at 262-67.
On the whole, the categorical rules may be more efficient than a case-by-case determination of costs
and benefits. See generally Diver, supra; Ehrlich & Posner, supra; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
" I am not arguing that Congress or the SEC made any express cost-benefit tradeoffs in formu-
lating the exemptions. I discuss the intent that underlies the exemptions when appropriate, but my
focus is on whether the exemptions are economically efficient, no matter what the original intent was.
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larly concerning the benefits of registration, are not as certain as one
would prefer. Nevertheless, the types of costs and benefits are clear and
their magnitudes can at least be approximated. I will first discuss the costs
and benefits of registration generally and then focus on the exemptions.
In considering these costs and benefits, one point must be kept clearly
in mind. The costs and benefits of registration are not the same as the
costs and benefits of a registered offering. Some of the costs incurred by
an issuer in a registered offering would have been incurred even if regis-
tration were not required. Some of the benefits to investors of the informa-
tion required to be disclosed would have been provided through voluntary
disclosure. The costs and benefits of registration are the incremental costs
and benefits above those that would have occurred in an unregulated se-
curities offering.
1. The Benefits of Registration
The purpose of the registration requirement "is to protect investors by
promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed in-
vestment decisions." 23 The mandatory disclosure required by the Securi-
ties Act might benefit securities investors in two ways: (1) by increasing
investors' returns; and (2) by reducing the riskiness of investments. Each
of these possible benefits is difficult to quantify.
a. Increased Returns
The information provided in the registration statement and prospectus
might enable investors to estimate more accurately the expected value of
the returns generated by the security and thereby avoid losses due to mis-
pricing. For example, assume that Acme Corporation is offering to sell an
investor one share of stock. And assume that, if registration is not re-
quired, the investor assigns the following probabilities and values to the
Acme stock:
23 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
1996]
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Probability Present Value
1/3 $10
1/3 $50
'1/3 $90
EXPECTED PRESENT VALUE = $50
If the investor is not risk averse, she should be willing to pay up to $50
for the stock because that is the stock's expected present value.
Assume now ihat the Acme offering is registered and that the prospec-
tus provides the investor with better information than she had in the ab-
sence of registration, allowing her to revise her valuation of the security.
Assume that she now assigns the following probabilities and values to the
Acme stock:
Probability Present Value
1/3 $10
1/3 $40
1/3 $70
EXPECTED PRESENT VALUE = $40
With better information about the company, the investor is willing to pay
only $40 for the stock. Her benefit from registration (ignoring the cost of
compliance) is $10, the loss she avoided by being better able to calculate
the investment's expected value.24
b. Reduced Risk
A second possible benefit of mandatory disclosure is reduction of an
investment's riskiness even if the expected value of the investment does not
change.2 5 Assume again that, in the absence of registration, the investor
2 The investor might not capture the entire benefit. The distribution of the benefit between the
investor and Acme will depend on the relative shapes of the demand and supply curves for capital.
" This second theory is probably more likely. As Carol Simon argues,
The existence of substantial uncertainty about the true value of a security need not imply
that the issue will be, on average, overvalued or undervalued. Rather the expectations of
rational investors should be unbiased. The availability of quality information will, how-
ever, affect the riskiness of the purchase. As such, the effects of legislation aimed at increas-
ing investor information should be reflected in changes in the dispersion of market-adjusted
returns.
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calculates a 3 chance of a $10 present value, a '/ chance of a $50 present
value, and a 1A chance of a $90 present value, for an expected present
value of $50. Using the information provided in the registration statement,
the investor revises her estimates as follows:
Probability Present Value
1/3 $40
1/3 $50
1/3 $60
EXPECTED PRESENT VALUE = $50
The expected value of the investment is still $50, the same as without
registration, but the risk associated with the investment is now lower. Us-
ing the information in the registration statement, the investor has limited
the possible outcomes to a narrower range. If she is risk averse, her gain
is the reduction in the risk of the investment.26
c. The Available Evidence
A few studies have tried to measure the benefits of registration by com-
paring the returns on stock issues prior to the passage of the Securities Act
with the returns on stock issues subsequent to passage of the Act.27 They
have, for the most part, found no statistically significant differences in the
market-adjusted performance of securities issues after passage of the Act:
investors did not earn significantly better returns after 1933 than before.
This result is inconsistent with the better-returns theory of the benefits of
registration; if returns were not better after 1933, registration has not al-
lowed investors, on average, to more accurately price securities. However,
the evidence is mixed. A study by Carol Simon found no significant in-
creases in returns after 1933 on the whole, but "a highly significant in-
Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance
of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 295, 295 (1989).
26 If the investor is completely risk neutral, the risk is irrelevant to her. Because the expected
value of the investment is the same with or without registration, registration has not benefitted her.
" See Benston, supra note 6; Benston, supra note 15; Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of
Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613 (1981); Simon,
supra note 25; Stigler, supra note 6; Stigler, supra note 14.
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crease in the average returns on . . . [non-New York Stock Exchange
initial public offerings]."' 8
All of the studies have found a significantly lower variance in returns
after the passage of the Securities Act.29 However, this difference is sub-
ject to two interpretations."0 The reduced variance could be the result of
investors having better information as a result of the registration require-
ment, with a resulting reduction in risk. 1 This would be a benefit to risk-
averse investors. Another interpretation is that the registration require-
ment drove riskier, but net positive value, securities from the public mar-
kets to unregulated markets or out of the market entirely. 2 The variance
dropped not because investors had better information about returns, but
because the riskier securities were no longer in the market. If this is true,
registration may have produced a loss to investors, especially investors
who are not risk-averse, by limiting their investment choices.
2. The Costs of Registration
The cost of making a registered securities offering includes (1) the di-
rect expenses of preparing, filing, and distributing the required disclosure
documents, (2) the commissions and fees paid to underwriters and others
selling the securities, (3) the delay associated with registration, (4) the
costs of maintaining the government registration system, and (5) other
miscellaneous costs associated with registration. Some of the costs in the
first two categories-disclosure and selling expenses-would have been in-
curred even in the absence of a registration requirement. For those costs,
the cost of the registration requirement is the increase in cost resulting
from registration. The costs in the final three categories are directly attrib-
utable to the registration requirement; they would not have been incurred
in an unregulated market.
• Simon, supra note 25, at 306.
2g Jarrell, supra note 27, at 667; Simon, supra note 25, at 309; Stigler, supra note 6, at 122;
Stigler, supra note 14, at 419.
o EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 313; ROMANO, supra note 20, at 94-95.
8 Irwin Friend and Edward Herman suggest that the reduced variance found by Stigler "was a
result of improved disclosure of the degree of risk and a consequent greater reluctance by investors to
buy risky new issues." Friend & Herman, supra note 12, at 391.
2 For example, George Stigler points out that "many more new companies used the market in
the 1920s than in the 1950s-from one viewpoint a major effect of the SEC was to exclude new
companies." Stigler, supra note 6, at 122.
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a. Direct Expenses of Preparing, Filing, and Distributing the Re-.
quired Disclosure
Attorneys must draft the registration statement and shepherd it through
the SEC review process. Accountants must prepare and audit the com-
pany's financial statements. The company must print the registration
statement and distribute the prospectus to potential investors. In an initial
public offering, these costs directly associated with the preparation of the
registration statement could total from $200,000 to $500,000.3 One study
found that, for initial public offerings, these direct expenses ranged from
an average of 2.10% to an average of 9.64% of the gross offering amount,
depending on the size of the offering. 4 Offerings by seasoned issuers are
less expensive. Another study indicated average expenses ranging from
0.14% to 6.78% of the offering amount for underwritten public offerings
by companies already publicly traded on a stock exchange. 5 A company
making a registered public offering also has increased internal costs. Exec-
utives and employees are diverted from the company's business to prepar-
ing the registration statement and otherwise complying with the registra-
tion requirement.3" These costs are not as easy to quantify.
Of course, some of these costs would have been incurred even if the
offering was not registered. It is difficult to estimate the additional direct
costs imposed by the registration requirement because "we do not know
what things firms would disclose, and to whom, in the absence of the
" Alan K. Austin & Teresa L. Remillard, An Overview of Initial Public Offerings, Practicing
Law Institute, CREATIVE CORPORATE FINANCING TECHNIQUES 1986 (Oct. 21, 1986) (WESTLAW,
541 PLI/Corp 467) ($200,000-500,000); John F. Olson & Scott D. Krill, What Makes a Company a
Good Candidate for Going Public?, ALI-ABA POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW (June 21, 1993) (WESTLAW, C859 ALI-ABA 5) (approximately $400,000 for a $5 million
offering); Howard D. Sterling, Deciding to Go Public: The Importance of the Intangible Factors,
Practicing Law Institute, How TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 1989 (July 1, 1989)
(WESTLAW, 656 PLI/Corp 23) ($200,000-500,000); Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public: Prac-
tice, Procedure and Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1981) ($175,000-350,000). An SEC
advisory committee found average costs of $105,151 for filing an S-1 registration statement and
$163,450 for filing an S-7 registration statement, but those figures were based on a very limited
number of observations. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO
THE SEC, supra note 20, at 26.
Jay R. Ritter, The Costs of Going Public, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 269, 272 (1987).
" Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Alternative Methods for Raising Capital: Rights Versus Underwrit-
ten Offerings, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 273, 276 (1977).
6 Olson & Krill, supra note 33; Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Investment Banking and the Capital
Acquisition Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 19-20 (1986).
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securities laws."I' 7 Some attorneys claim that the costs of an exempted pri-
vate placement are "only a fraction of the cost of an [initial public offer-
ing].""8 George Benston found that accounting and other direct expenses
in private placements on average ranged from fifty to seventy-five percent
less than the expenses in registered public offerings, depending on the size
of the offering." ' These differences undoubtedly overstate the impact of
the registration requirement. Because the availability of the exemptions
from registration turns on factors such as the number of purchasers, their
sophistication, and whether they have an existing relationship with the
issuer, private placements are, on average, quite different from registered
offerings. Everything else being equal, a public offering would be more
expensive than the typical private placement even if the public offering
did not have to be registered. Thus, although the registration requirement
probably accounts for a significant portion of the legal, accounting, print-
ing, and other direct costs of offering securities, the exact magnitude is
unclear.
b. Underwriting Fees and Sales Commissions
The compensation paid to underwriters and securities dealers in a pub-
lic offering varies from roughly six to ten percent of the gross proceeds of
the offering,4 although the percentage can be lower for large offerings by
seasoned issuers.41 Compensation would have to be paid to sellers even if
registration was not required, but the Securities Act clearly imposes
higher costs on underwriters. For one thing, section 5 of the Act restricts
the manner in which securities can be sold; these restrictions undoubtedly
make the offering more costly to administer. The Act also makes under-
writers liable in certain circumstances for material misstatements or omis-
sions in the registration statement and other sales-related materials. 42 This
liability forces the underwriters (and others involved in the offering) to
37 EASTERBROOK I& FIscHEL, supra note 6, at 310.
Olson & Krill, ;upra note 33, at *21.
'9 Benston, supra note 15, at 64.
40 Austin & Remillard, supra note 33 (7 to 10%); Olson & Krill, supra note 33 (6 to 9%);
Ritter, supra note 34, at 272 (7.24 to 10.63%, depending on the size of the offering and the type of
underwriting); Schneider et al., supra note 33, at 29-31 (7 to 10%).
41 See Smith, supra note 35, at 276 (in a study limited to seasoned issuers, reporting underwrit-
ing compensation under 4% for certain very large offerings).
41 Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1994).
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participate actively in the preparation and verification of the registration
statement and in effect provides investors partial insurance against risk.
Some of the underwriters' compensation in a registered offering must be
attributed to these verification and insurance functions.
The exact magnitude of the increased selling costs due to registration is
uncertain. George Benston found that compensation in private placements
of debt in the early 1950s was on average roughly one-half to one-fifth of
the compensation in public offerings, depending on the size of the offer-
ing,4 but given the differences between private placements and registered
offerings, this probably overstates the increased underwriting costs result-
ing from registration.
c. The Cost of Delay
Another cost of registration is the delay that results from the registra-
tion process. Before the issuer may sell the securities, it must prepare and
file a registration statement and wait for the SEC to review it so it can
become effective. 44 The delay can vary from issue to issue, but, for an
initial public offering, the lapse of time between beginning to prepare the
registration statement and its effective date "may well exceed six months.
It rarely will be less than three months."45 In 1994, the average delay
between the filing of an S-1 registration statement and its effectiveness
was seventy-four days.46 The average delay for Form S-2 filings was
forty-nine days and the average delay for Form S-3 filings was forty-three
days.4 7
The cost of this delay to the issuer is the loss in present value between
the time the proceeds would have been received without registration and
when they were actually received. For example, assume that an issuer is
" Benston, supra note 15, at 62.
44 The issuer may not finalize any sales until the registration statement becomes effective. Securi-
ties Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1994).
4' Schneider et al., supra note 33, at 28.
' Letter from James R. Mayo, SEC Staff Accountant to the author (June 30, 1995) (on file
with author). This average includes what the SEC calls "restarts." Restarts include two situations: (1)
when the delay between completion of SEC staff processing and the filing of a subsequent amendment
exceeds 90 days; and (2) when "an original filing is so poorly prepared that the staff is not in a
position to begin the review process until a substantive amendment is filed." Id. Excluding restarts,
the average delay for an S-1 filing in 1994 was 62 days. Id.
47 Id.
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
raising $1 million (after expenses), that the investment for which the
money is being raised will produce a four percent net annual return, and
that registration causes a three month delay. The cost associated with the
delay is:
.$1 million - $1 million = $9901.
1 + (.04/4)
However, the cost of the delay associated with registration would be less
to the extent that issuers are able to anticipate their need for capital and
initiate the registration process before the money is actually needed (as in
a shelf registration).
d. Costs of the Regulatory System
Another major cost of the Securities Act's registration requirement,
sometimes overlooked, is the cost to the SEC of operating the regulatory
system: the cost of reviewing and commenting on registration statements,
taking enforcement actions against those who fail to comply, producing
regulations and releases explaining and interpreting the registration re-
quirement, and so on.
In 1995, the SEC handled an estimated 1200 initial filings of registra-
tion statements and an estimated 4670 repeat filings and post-effective
amendments.48 The SEC devoted approximately 125 staff years to the re-
view of registration statutes in 1995, at an approximate cost of $14 mil-
lion.4 The average employee cost per filing, including repeat filings and
The following table shows the number of filings for the past few years:
FILINGS OF REGISTRATION STATEMENTS
Year Initial Repeat & Post-Effective Amendments
1991 707 3588
1992 1047 4246
1993 1174 4652
1994 (est.) 1190 4660
1995 (est.) 1200 4670
The 1993, 1994, and 1995 figures are from the fiscal year 1995 budget. BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT--FISGAL YEAR 1995, at 962. The 1992 figure is from the fiscal year 1994
budget. BuDET OF THE UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENr-FIscAL YEAR 1994, app. at 1141. The
1991 figure is from the fiscal year 1993 budget. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVErRN-
MENT-FIsCAL YEAR 1993, app. 1 at 1032. These figures do not include filings by investment
companies.
, The following table provides similar figures for prior years:
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post-effective amendments, was $2392 in 1995.50 Figures from prior years
are comparable. 5' The average employee cost per each initial filing, ex-
cluding repeat filings and post-effective amendments, is probably a better
measure of the SEC cost for each offering. Over the past five years, this
cost ranged from $10,174 per filing in 1992 to $12,607 per filing in
1991.52
These numbers undoubtedly understate the regulatory cost of the regis-
tration requirement. They exclude overhead. 5' They cover only the review
of registration statutes and exclude other registration-related activities
SEC STAFF YEARS DEVOTED TO REVIEW OF REGISTRATION STATEMENTS
Year Staff Years Approximate Cost
1991 91 $ 8,913,000
1992 105 $10,652,000
1993 113 $12,219,000
1994 (est.) 122 $12,953,000
1995 (est.) 125 $14,043,000
Letter from Susan Baumann, SEC Deputy Executive Director to the author (Nov. 3, 1994) (on file
with author). A staff year is approximately 2080 hours of employee time (40 hours a week times 52
weeks). Letter from Herbert Scholl, Chief Management Analyst, SEC Division of Corporation Fi-
nance to the author (Sept. 28, 1994) (on file with author). These figures do not include investment
company registration statements. Letter from Susan Baumann, supra. They also do not account for
any overhead. Letter from Herbert Scholl, supra.
' This figure was calculated by dividing the employee cost figure for 1995 by the total number
of filings.
51 The complete figures are:
Year Average Employee Cost Per Filing
1991 $2075
1992 2012
1993 2097
1994 (est.) 2214
1995 (est.) 2392
52 The complete figures are:
Year Average Employee Cost Per Initial Filing
1991 $12,607
1992 10,174
1993 10,408
1994 (est.) 10,885
1995 (est.) 11,703
These figures tell us little about the regulatory costs associated with any particular offering because
the SEC resources devoted to each filing vary tremendously. Among other things, the SEC devotes
more effort to reviewing the registration statements of companies making initial public offerings. Abba
Poliakoff, SEC Review: Comfort or Illusion?, 17 BALT. L. REV. 40, 44-45 (1987).
53 Letter from Herbert Scholl, supra note 49.
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such as issuing no-action letters and interpretive releases and bringing en-
forcement actions against those who fail to comply. They also ignore the
costs of criminal prosecutions incurred by the Attorney General and vari-
ous U.S. Attorneys. These figures do, however, provide a rough order-of-
magnitude estimate of the costs incurred by the SEC in administering the
registration requirement.
Securities Act registrants must pay a filing fee of one twenty-ninth of
one percent of the maximum aggregate offering price,54 roughly $345 for
every $1 million raised. However, it would be double-counting to include
both this filing fee and the administrative costs of the SEC as costs of
registration because the filing fee is used to offset administrative costs.
The filing fee is merely a redistribution of the administrative cost from the
SEC to the issuer. If the SEC's actual registration-associated costs exceed
the filing fees it collects, only the actual administrative costs should be
counted. If the filing fee exceeds the actual SEC costs associated with re-
gistration, the excess should be considered a tax on registrants. The total
cost to issuers is then the amount of the filing fee.
e. Other Costs
Registration involves other costs that are less direct and, in some cases,
more difficult to -quantify, but nevertheless real. One such cost is the possi-
ble competitive disadvantage to the issuer from having to disclose detailed
information about the company to the public, including competitors.55 An-
other cost is that the registration requirements trigger periodic reporting
" The Securities Act provides for a fee of 1/50 of one percent of the aggregate offering price.
Securities Act of 1933 § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(b) (1994). Congress temporarily increased the fee to
1/29 of one percent in 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-121, 107 Stat. 1168 (1993), and reenacted that increase
in 1994, Pub. L. 103-352, 108 Stat. 3148 (1994). A bipartisan proposal to gradually reduce the fee to
1/55 of one percent had not been enacted at the time this Article went to press, but appeared likely to
pass. See SEC Authorization Bill Clears Panel; Would Cut Fees, Regularize Process, 28 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 278 (Mar. 1, 1996).
11 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC, supra note
33, at 22-23; Smith, supra note 36, at 19-20; Sterling, supra note 33. The Advisory Committee
concluded that "although companies do use the disclosure documents of their competitors to compare
performance, there does not appear to be any significant competitive cost associated with current re-
porting obligations." REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC,
supra note 20, at 22-23. Only three of the 26 companies the Advisory Committee studied acknowl-
edged such a competitive cost. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO
THE SEC, supra note 20, at 23 n.23.
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requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.5" These Ex-
change Act reporting requirements are expensive and involve considerable
executive and employee time.57 However, these costs are more properly
attributable to the Exchange Act than to the Securities Act. And if a com-
pany is already subject to the Exchange Act reporting requirements, Se-
curities Act registration does not significantly increase the Exchange Act
cost.
III. TRANSACTION EXEMPTIONS FROM THE REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENT
The Securities Act exempts from the registration requirement sales of
both particular types of securities (securities exemptions) "8 and of nonex-
empt securities in particular types of transactions (transaction exemp-
tions). " The Act also authorizes the SEC to enact additional regulatory
transaction exemptions.60 The exemptions only free the issuer from the
Act's registration requirements; in general, the prohibitions against fraud
in the offer or sale of securities still apply.61
" Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act requires issuers whose registration statements have become
effective under the Securities Act to file certain Exchange Act reports, unless the registered securities
are held by fewer than 300 persons. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)
(1994).
57 One author estimates that the costs associated with periodic reporting "should be minimally
budgeted at $75-150,000 per year." Sterling, supra note 33, at *4.
" See Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1994). Not all of the exemptions in
§ 3(a) are securities exemptions; some are actually transaction exemptions. 1 HAZEN, supra note 2,
at 128; STEINBERG, supra note 3, at 48.
" See Securities Act of 1933 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1994).
60 Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994), authorizes the SEC to
exempt issues of securities with an aggregate offering price to the public not in excess of $5 million,
"if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in
the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the
limited character of the public offering .... Id. See also Securities Act of 1933 § 3(c),,15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(c) (1994) (authorizing the SEC to exempt securities issued by small business investment com-
panies if regulation "is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors.").
61 Section 4 of the Act provides only that "[t]he provisions of section 5 shall not apply to" the
exempted transactions. Securities Act of 1933 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1994). Anti-fraud provisions
such as §§ 12(a)(2) and 17(a) still apply. The securities exemptions in § 3 appear more general, but
a parenthetical in § 12(a)(2) indicates that it covers securities "whether or not exempted by the provi-
sions of section 3, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said section." Securities Act of 1933
§ 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1994). Similarly, § 17(c) specifically provides that "[tihe exemp-
tions provided in section 3 shall not apply to the provisions of this section." Securities Act of 1933
§ 17(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) (1994). But see Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995) (confus-
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This Article focuses on exempted transactions-particular kinds of of-
ferings which Congress or the SEC has decided do not need to be regis-
tered. The transaction exemptions can be grouped into three categories,
each with a different economic justification. Some of the transaction ex-
emptions are based on the view that, for relatively small offerings, the cost
of registration is proportionately too great compared to the benefit. I call
these exemptions the small offering exemptions.62 Some of the exemptions
are premised on a belief that certain offerees, because of their sophistica-
tion, bargaining power, or access to information about the issuer, do not
need the protection registration provides. I call these exemptions the so-
phisticated offeree exemptions. 6 A third category of exemptions, which I
call the deference exemptions, 64 is based on the view that regulation of the
offering by some other authority eliminates the need for registration with
the SEC.
The three categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rule 504,
for example, is to some extent both a small offering exemption and a def-
erence exemption. 5 Rule 505 has elements of both a small offering ex-
emption and a sophisticated offeree exemption.66 However, it is easier to
discuss the three categories separately because the economic theory sup-
porting each is different. The next sections summarize the particular ex-
emptions within each of the three categories and discuss the economics
underlying each category. 67
ing the issue of whether there is liability under § 12 with the issue of whether an offering is a public
offering).
" See infra part III.A. I refer to an offering that qualifies for such an exemption as a small
offering.
63 See infra part III.B. I refer to an offering that qualifies for such an exemption as a sophisti-
cated offeree offering.
" See infra part III.C. I refer to an offering that qualifies for such an exemption as a deference
offering.
* See infra text a.ccompanying notes 73-74 and 152-53.
e See infra text accompanying notes 75-80.
'7 The Securities Act contains transaction exemptions other than those discussed above. Most of
these exemptions are directed at the problem of resales by the original purchasers in an offering or the
liability of securities professionals in the secondary trading of securities. See Securities Act of 1933
§ 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994) (exempting "transactions by any person other than an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer"); § 4(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3) (1994) (exempting transactions by dealers that
are not part of a distribution by the issuer and occur more than a specified period of time after the
issuer's public offering); § 4(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1994) (exempting broker's executions of cus-
tomers' market trading transactions, if those transactions are not solicited by the broker).
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A. Small Offering Exemptions
1. An Overview of the Small Offering Exemptions
Regulation A68 and Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D6" are the major
small offering exemptions. Regulation S70 is also best treated as a small
offering exemption.
Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D were adopted pursuant to the
SEC's authority under section 3(b) of the Act to exempt offerings with an
aggregate offering price of not more than $5 million.7 1 They were
"designed primarily for smaller issuers that are not subject to periodic
disclosure requirements and for which the preparation of offering circu-
lars and the expenses resulting from the registration process may be dis-
proportionately burdensome. "72
Rule 504 exempts offerings whose aggregate offering prices do not ex-
ceed $1 million.7 ' Rule 504 is available only to companies that are not
subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act,74 but the num-
ber of offerees and purchasers is unlimited and very few other restrictions
apply. No information of any sort has to be provided to investors.
Rule 505 of Regulation D exempts offerings with an aggregate offering
price of up to $5 million. 5 Rule 505 is available to reporting companies,
but it is otherwise more restrictive than Rule 504. The issuer may sell to
no more than thirty-five nonaccredited purchasers, 6 plus an unlimited
number of accredited investors.7 7 The issuer must furnish to nonaccredited
Those exemptions are important, but do not relate directly to the basic problem covered in this
Article: the protection of investors in primary offerings by issuers. Therefore, I will not discuss the
other exemptions.
68 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-230.263. (1995).
69 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504, 230.505 (1995).
70 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.904 (1995).
71 Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,106, at 84,918 (Mar. 8, 1982).
72 Securities Act Release No. 6339, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,014, at 84,457 (Aug. 7, 1981). For a general review of Regulation D and its history, see Mark A.
Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform,
68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225 (1990).
73 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1995).
74 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a)(1) (1995).
75 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1995).
78 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (1995).
- 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (1995).
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purchasers information about the issuer, its business, and the securities
being offered. 8 General solicitation of investors and general advertising
are prohibited 9 and resale of the securities purchased in a Rule 505 offer-
ing is restricted." °
Regulation A,"1 another section 3(b) exemption, exempts offerings with
an aggregate offering price of up to $5 million. 2 The issuer must file with
the SEC a disclosure document known as an offering statement8" and
must provide investors with a prospectus-like document known as an of-
fering circular,"4 which includes the same narrative and financial informa-
tion as the filed offering statement. 85 Regulation A does not involve a stat-
utory registration, but it is, in essence, a "mini-registration,"8' 6 a "less
expensive and less burdensome" version of the statutory filing and pro-
spectus delivery requirements.8 7
78 Rule 502(b)(1), (2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1), (2) (1995). The exact information required
varies depending on the size of the offering and whether the issuer is a reporting company under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rule 502(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2) (1995). At least some
audited financial statements are required in all cases. Rule 502(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)
(1995). Regulation D does not require that any information be furnished to accredited investors. Rule
502(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (1995).
79 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1995).
so 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1995).
81 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (1995).
82 17 C.F.R. § 2:30.251(b) (1995).
"' See Rule 252, 17 C.F.R. § 230.252 (1995). This offering statement is filed on Form 1-A. See
Form 1-A, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7325-7327C. In 1992, the SEC added to Regulation A a
"test-the-waters" provision to allow issuers to solicit potential investors prior to filing the offering
statement. Rule 254, 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (1995). Except as allowed by Rule 254, pre-filing offers to
sell are still prohibited. Rule 251(d)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)(i) (1995).
' No sales may be made pursuant to Regulation A unless the Form 1-A offering statement has
been qualified, a preliminary or final offering circular is furnished to the investor at least 48 hours
prior to mailing the confirmation of sale, and a final offering circular is delivered to the investor with
or prior to the confirmation of sale. Rule 251(d)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2)(i) (1995).
88 Rule 253(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.253(a) (1995).
88 7A J. WILLIAM HICKS, ExEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
5-19 (rev. ed. 1993). Accord, 3A HAROLD BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE
LAW § 5.05[1] (1995) ("Regulation A, although technically and conceptually a conditional exemption
from the registration requirements for many purposes is a less stringent form of registration for rela-
tively small offerings.").
" 7A HICKS, supra note 86, at 5.20.
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Regulation S88 exempts certain offerings of securities outside the United
States. Rule 903,89 the exemption for primary extraterritorial offerings,
imposes two general conditions. First, all offers and sales must be made in
"offshore transaction[s]." 90 The offer may not be made to a person in the
United States and the buy order must originate from a buyer outside the
United States or on the floor of a foreign securities exchange.91 Second, no
"directed selling efforts" may be made in the United States.9 2 The general
effect of Regulation S is to exempt offerings that are entirely (or almost
entirely) extraterritorial.
Regulation S might appear to be a deference exemption: for offerings
wholly outside the United States, the SEC is deferring to the appropriate
foreign regulators.9" However, Regulation S is not in any way conditioned
on the existence of foreign regulation. It is available even when the off-
shore offering is completely unregulated, and even when there is no one to
defer to. Regulation S is more appropriately categorized as a small offer-
ing exemption. The SEC sees Securities Act registration as "intended to
protect the U.S. capital markets and investors purchasing in the U.S. mar-
ket .... ,,"9 Because Regulation S applies only when there are no offers or
sales within the United States, a Regulation S offering is, for the SEC's
purposes, essentially the same as no offering at all-the ultimate small
offering.
- 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.904 (1995).
8 17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (1995).
'o Rule 903(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a) (1995).
91 Rule 902(i)(1)(i),(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(i)(1)(i),(ii) (1995).
'9 Rule 903(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b) (1995). Rule 902(b)(1) defines "directed selling efforts"
as
any activity undertaken for the purpose of, or that could reasonably be expected to have the
effect of, conditioning the market in the United States for any of the securities being offered
in reliance on this Regulation S. Such activity includes placement of an advertisement in a
publication with a general circulation in the United States that refers to the offering of
securities being made in reliance upon this Regulation S.
17 C.F.R. § 230.902(b)(1) (1995). The rule contains several exclusions from this general definition.
See Rule 902(b)(2)-(7), 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(b)(2)-(7) (1995).
" To quote the SEC release that adopted Regulation S, "As investors choose their markets, they
choose the laws and regulations applicable in such markets." Securities Act Release No. 6863, [1989-
1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,524, at 80,665 (Apr. 24, 1990).
94 Id.
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2. The Economics of the Small Offering Exemptions
a. The Basic Theory
The economic rationale for the small offering exemptions rests on econ-
omies of scale-the relative increase in the total costs and benefits of regis-
tration as the dollar amount of an offering increases. The total benefit of
registration ought to increase in direct proportion to the dollar amount of
the offering. The more money investors invest, the more they could lose
and the more they benefit from registration, everything else being equal.95
The average benefit of registration per dollar invested should be relatively
constant.
Changes in the dollar amount of the offering affect the total cost of
registration differently. Registering an offering involves a substantial fixed
cost, no matter how large the offering. For a relatively small offering, the
average cost per dollar of proceeds is relatively high. As the dollar amount
of the offering increases, the issuer incurs additional costs, increasing the
total cost of registration, but the initial fixed cost is spread over a larger
offering amount. Due to these economies of scale, the total cost of registra-
tion increases as the dollar amount of the offering increases, but at a rate
less than the rate of increase of the dollar amount.9" As a result, the aver-
age cost of registration per dollar invested decreases as the size of the
offering increases.
Studies by Jay Ritter, Clifford W. Smith, Jr., and George Benston
have all found economies of scale in registered offerings. Ritter surveyed
1028 underwritten initial public offerings and found that, for both firm
commitment and best efforts underwritings, the percentage of the proceeds
going to both the underwriting discount and other cash expenses varied
inversely with the size of the offering.97 For example, the average total
9' If there is secondary trading of the registered securities, the disclosure in the registration state-
ment could have spillover effects benefitting the secondary trading market. That would increase the
total benefit of registration, but would not significantly affect the analysis.
"6 "Because the offering expenses other than underwriting costs do not vary significantly with
the size of the offering, the [average] cost of capital in a public offering is reduced if more money is
raised." Austin & Remillard, supra note 33, at *4. Even the SEC has accepted this argument. See
Securities Act Release No. 5914, 43 Fed. Reg. 10876, 10882 (Mar. 15, 1978) ("If the offering is for a
relatively small amount of money, the portion of the proceeds utilized for third party services may be
quite large.").
7 Ritter, supra note 34, at 272. Ritter's full results appear in the following table:
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direct cash expenses for a firm commitment offering of from $100,000 to
$1,999,999 were 19.48% of the proceeds, compared to 9.34% for offerings
of $10 million or more.9" Smith reviewed common stock offerings by sea-
soned issuers from 1971 to 1975 and, like Ritter, found that the average
percentage of offering proceeds devoted to expenses was inversely related
to the size of the offering. 9 For offerings between $500,000 and $1 mil-
DIRECT EXPENSES OF GOING PUBLIC AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS PROCEEDS,
1977-1982.
Number of Underwriting Other Total cash
Gross proceeds ($) offers discount (%) expenses (%) expenses (%)
Firm commitment offers
100,000-1,999,999 68 9.84 9.64 19.48
2,000,000-3,999,999 165 9.83 7.60 17.43
4,000,000-5,999,999 133 9.10 5.67 14.77
6,000,000-9,999,999 122 8.03 4.31 12.34
10,000,000-120,174,195 176 7.24 2.10 9.34
All offers 664 8.67 5.36 24.03
Best efforts offers
100,000-1,999,999 175 10.63 9.52 20.15
2,000,000-3,999,999 146 10.00 6.21 16.21
4,000,000-5,999,999 23 9.86 3.71 13.57
6,000,000-9,999,999 15 9.80 3.42 13.22
10,000,000-120,174,195 5 8.03 2.40 10.43
All offers 364 10.26 7.48 17.74
9 Ritter, supra note 34, at 272. This comparison understates the difference between smaller and
larger offerings because smaller offerings were more likely to be best efforts underwritings, which had
slightly higher expenses. Ritter, supra note 34, at 272.
" Smith, supra note 35, at 276. Smith's results appear in the following table:
Other Total cost
Compensation expenses as as a
Size of issue as a percent a percent percent of
(S millions) Number of proceeds of proceeds proceeds
Under 0.50 0 - - -
0.50 to 0.99 6 6.96 6.78 13.74
1.00 to 1.99 18 10.40 4.89 15.29
2.00 to 4.99 61 6.59 2.87 9.47
5.00 to 9.99 66 5.50 1.53 7.03
10.00 to 19.99 91 4.84 0.71 5.55
20.00 to 49.99 156 4.30 0.37 4.67
50.00 to 99.99 70 3.97 0.21 4.18
100.00 to 500.00 16 3.81 0.14 3.95
Total/Average 484 5.02 1.15 6.17
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lion, total expenses averaged 13.74% of the proceeds, compared to 3.95%
for offerings between $100 million and $500 million. 00 Benston's analysis
of debt issues in the 1950s is similar.1 01 He found that the total cost of
publicly offered debt issues ranged from 10.24% of gross proceeds for of-
ferings in the $500,000-$999,999 range to 1.22% for offerings of $20 mil-
lion or more.10 2 Benston also found that private placements were cheaper
on average than comparable public offerings. Significantly, Benston's
study found that the difference between public offerings and private place-
ments was also inversely related to the size of the offering: the smaller the
offering, the greater the differential cost of registration. 0 In effect, due to
economies of scale, "the registration system operates as a regressive tax
based on the size of the issue and presumably, therefore, the issuer. '10 4
Smith's work also considered rights offerings; the relative results were similar, but, for any given
offering size, the percentages were smaller. Smith, supra note 35, at 276.
100 Smith, supra note 35, at 276.
201 Benston, supra note 15, at 61.
so' Benston, supra note 15, at 61. Benston's full results are reproduced below:
COMPARISON OF COSTS OF FLOTATION AS PERCENT OF PROCEEDS
PUBLICLY OFFERED AND PRIVATELY PLACED DEBT ISSUES
1951, 1953, AND 1955
Size of Issue (millions)
20.0-
.5-.9 1.0-1.9 2.0-4.9 5.0-9.9 10.0-19.9 over
Total Cost
Publicly offered 10.24 8.00 3.33 1.53 1.44 1.22
Privately placed 2.14 1.52 1.12 .83 .63 .44
Difference ...... 8.10 6.48 2.21 .70 .81 .78
Compensation (a)
Publicly offered 6.50 5.50 2.25 .70 .68 .73
Privately placed 1.31 .97 .69 .49 .31 .22
Difference ...... 5.19 4.03 2.56 .30 .37 .51
Other Expenses
Publicly offered 3.14 2.20 1.24 .85 .61 .42
Privately placed .83 .59 .43 .34 .32 .22
Difference ...... 2.31 1.61 .81 .51 .29 .20
(a) Compensation refers to the amount received by investment bankers, finders, or agents.
o Benston, supra note 15, at 61.
' Manne, supra note 17, at 49.
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Figure A illustrates the relationship between the total cost and the total
benefit of registration and the dollar amount of the offering. 0 5
FIGURE A
$1
The curve TB represents the total benefit of registration: it is proportion-
ate to the dollar amount of the offering. The curve TC shows the total
cost of registration: it indicates a large fixed cost and a declining average
cost as the amount of the offering increases. The net benefit of the regis-
tration requirement for any given offering amount is the vertical differ-
ence between the TB curve and the TC curve. When the dollar amount of
the offering is less than $x, the difference is negative; the total cost of
registration exceeds the total benefit. Registration of an offering of this
size is economically inefficient. As the dollar amount of the offering in-
"05 The costs and benefits shown in Figure A are the costs and benefits of registration-the
incremental costs and benefits above those in an unregulated offering. Neither the exact slopes of the
two curves nor their linear nature is crucial to the analysis.
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creases, the total benefit of registration increases faster than the total cost.
Eventually (when the offering amount is more than $x), the total benefit
of registration exceeds the total cost, and registration becomes efficient.110
If the only choices were full registration or full exemption, the dictates
of economic efficiency would be straightforward: require offerings to be
registered if their dollar amount exceeds $x; exempt them otherwise.107
For example, consider an offering of $1000 worth of stock to 100 inves-
tors. Assume that it would cost $100,000 to register that offering and that
the benefit of registration to the investors is $100. Requiring this offering
to be registered would be inefficient. The net cost of registration
($100,000) far exceeds the expected benefit ($100).'08
Now, consider an offering of $5 million worth of stock to the same 100
investors. Assume that the proportionate benefit of registration is the same
as in the $1000 offering. Thus, if registration is required, the total benefit
would be $500,000. The cost of registration might be higher, but as ex-
plained above, riot proportionately higher. Assume that the total cost of
registration for the $5 million offering is $300,000. The total benefit of
registration, $500,000, now exceeds the total cost, $300,000, and it is eco-
nomically efficient to require registration.
b. A Com~lication-Intermediate Disclosure Exemptions
The analysis in the preceding section oversimplifies the small offering
exemptions. It assumes a dualistic choice between registration and a com-
plete, unconditional exemption from all federal disclosure requirements.
Rule 504 of Regulation D nearly fits that idea of a total, unconditional
exemption. It exempts offerings of less than $1 million, with no additional
federal requirements. But there are other alternatives--intermediate op-
100 The TB and TO curves must intersect at some point, or the initial assumption that registra-
tion is efficient in at least some cases is violated. The broader claim by Stigler and others that the
Securities Act's registration requirement is economically inefficient on the whole is a claim that the
TB and TO curves never intersect, that TO always exceeds TB.
10' Of course, determining $x, the dollar amount at which the net benefit becomes positive,
would be far from simple.
100 If the investor. do absolutely no investigation and lose their entire investment, the total loss is
only $1000. It would cost 100 times that much to register the offering. Even if registration were
totally effective in preventing unexpected loss, which it undoubtedly is not, the gain would not be
worth the cost.
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tions between filing a registration statement and no mandatory disclosure
at all. Regulation A and Rule 505 have higher dollar limits than Rule
504, but also impose additional requirements on the issuer.Y°9 In particu-
lar, both rules require that certain information about the issuer be made
available to purchasers.
Intermediate disclosure rules like these-requiring some disclosure, but
not full registration-produce different costs and benefits than full regis-
tration. The cost of producing the information required by Rule 505 or
Regulation A is certainly less than the cost of full registration. ° But the
slope of the cost curve should be similar to that for a registered offering.
Producing the information required by the intermediate disclosure exemp-
tions involves a relatively large fixed cost, with lesser additional costs as
the dollar amount of the offering increases.
The benefits of intermediate disclosure should also be less than the ben-
efits of registration. Less information is provided and the information pro-
vided may be less reliable."' But those benefits, like the benefits of regis-
tration, should increase in proportion to the size of the offering, because
investors' gains from fuller disclosure depend on the size of their total
investment.
Figure B illustrates the economics of these intermediate disclosure small
offering exemptions.
109 The following analysis would also apply to the simplified registration forms, such as Forms
SB-1 and SB-2, available to small-business issuers.
110 If not, no rational issuer would ever choose to use those exemptions.
. The information required by Regulation A and Rule 505 is not subject to the same extensive
verification procedures as the information in the registration statement. Among other things, § 11
liability does not apply. In addition, the Regulation A and Rule 505 information is not required to be
in the same standardized format as the registration statement, so any benefits of standardization are
lost.
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The curves TB, and TCR duplicate the curves in Figure A. They re-
present the total benefit and total cost of registration. As in Figure A, they
intersect when the amount of the offering equals $x. The curve TC
shows the total cost associated with an intermediate disclosure exemption
like Rule 505, which imposes lesser information requirements.' 12 The
curve TB, shows the total benefit associated with the same intermediate
disclosure exemption. As indicated earlier, for any given dollar amount,
the cost and benefit of intermediate disclosure are each less than the cost
and benefit of a comparable registered offering.
The introduction of an intermediate disclosure option modifies our
prior conclusions about economic efficiency. Neither registration nor the
112 The slope of Tc i should not exceed the slope of TCR. Several costs of registration that vary
with the size of the offering-including the cost of delay, prospectus delivery requirements, and regis-
tration fees-are greater in a registered offering. There is no reason to suspect that any of the margi-
nal costs would be greater in an intermediate disclosure offering.
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intermediate disclosure small offering exemption produce a positive net
benefit for offerings smaller than $y. These offerings should be completely
exempted. If the size of the offering exceeds Sy, the intermediate disclos-
ure exemption produces a positive net benefit. At this point, it is efficient
to eliminate the full, absolute exemption and force issuers to use the inter-
mediate disclosure exemption. For offerings of more than $x, both regis-
tration and the intermediate disclosure exemption produce positive net
benefits. The preferred alternative is the one that, for any particular offer-
ing, produces the greatest net benefit. The intermediate disclosure exemp-
tion should be available until the point at which the net benefit of regis-
tration (TBR - TCR) exceeds the net benefit of the intermediate small
offering exemption (TBI - TC5)." In Figure B, this occurs approximately
when the dollar amount of the offering is $z. When the offering becomes
this large, the intermediate disclosure exemption should be unavailable
and registration should be required.
This analysis supports a multi-part regulatory structure: (1) a mini-
mum dollar amount below which offerings are left unregulated; (2) an
intermediate range of offerings for which some disclosure is required, but
not full registration; and (3) a dollar amount above which offerings must
be registered.114 This is precisely the structure one finds in the current
law. Rule 504 is a complete, unconditional exemption from federal dis-
closure requirements, but it is only available for offerings not exceeding
$1 million. Rule 505 and Regulation A are available for offerings of up to
$5 million, but the issuer must make certain information available to in-
vestors. No small offering exemption is available for offerings that exceed
$5 million; they must be registered unless some other type of exemption is
available.
.. The net benefit of registration must at some point exceed the net benefit of the intermediate
exemption because of the original assumption that registration is economically efficient in at least
some cases. If not, the registration requirement should be eliminated and "intermediate" disclosure
required for all offerings in an amount greater than Sx.
114 This analysis might support a continuously variable regulatory structure-some minimum
offering amount below which no disclosure is required, with the amount of disclosure and verification
increasing continuously as the dollar amount of the offering increases. The SEC has not adopted such
a structure. One economic reason not to is the cost, both to the SEC and to issuers, of determining the
applicable level of disclosure for any given offering. Given the increased transaction costs associated
with administering a continuous system, a tiered system like the one currently used by the SEC might
be economically preferable.
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The efficiency of a multi-level structure does not prove the efficiency of
the SEC's current small offering exemptions. The current small offering
exemptions are efficient only if the dollar amounts are set at the correct
levels. The foregoing theoretical analysis cannot show whether $1 million
is the equivalent of $y in Figure B or $5 million is the equivalent of $z. 115
Even if the $1 million and $5 million figures were correct when they were
adopted, they are not correct today. If the amounts are correct now, they
were not correct in the past and will not be correct in the future. Inflation
has a differential impact on the cost and benefit of registration. The cost
of registration increases as the cost of legal, accounting, underwriting,
printing, and other services increases. Inflation will also cause issuers to
seek greater amounts of capital on average, but for any given offering
amount, the benefit of registration is, for the most part, unaffected by
inflation. The risk of loss against which registration protects remains rela-
tively constant if the dollar amount of the offering is unchanged. Thus,
inflation causes the cost, but not the benefit, of registration to increase for
any given offering amount. The effect of inflation is to reduce the net
benefit of registration for every offering amount and thereby increase the
dollar amount at which registration (or an intermediate disclosure exemp-
tion) becomes efficient. To correct for this problem, the dollar amounts of
the small offering exemptions should be indexed for inflation or at least
changed regularly.1 ' The SEC has occasionally changed the dollar
amounts, but not regularly enough to account for inflation.' 17
B. Sophisticated Offeree Exemptions
1. An Overview of the Sophisticated Offeree Exemptions
The rationale for the sophisticated offeree exemptions is that certain
offerees, because of their sophistication, bargaining power, or access to
information about the issuer, do not need the protection that registration
"I Neither can the analysis show that the types of disclosure the SEC requires in the intermedi-
ate disclosure exemptions maximize net benefits.
6 Rulemaking to change the dollar amounts is not costless, so indexing is economically prefera-
ble. The only economic argument against changing the dollar amount is that such changes increase
information costs-investors and their lawyers must look up the correct dollar amount. However,
compared to the other costs associated with an offering of securities, the additional information costs of
an indexed dollar amount are trivial.
.. The maximum amount in Rule 505, for example, has not been changed since the adoption of
Regulation D in 1982.
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provides. The primary examples of sophisticated offeree exemptions are
sections 4(6) and 4(2) of the Securities Act and the regulatory safe harbor
for section 4(2), Rule 506 of Regulation D. Section 3(a)(9) of the Act
probably also fits into the sophisticated offeree category.
Section 4(2) of the Act exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering."'1 8 The legislative history of this exemption provides
little guidance," 9 but the Supreme Court has held that section 4(2) was
meant to exempt offers to "those who are shown to be able to fend for
themselves" or those such as "executive personnel who because of their
position have access to the same kind of information that the Act would
make available in the form of a registration statement."' 20 The dollar
amount of a section 4(2) offering is unlimited.
Rule 506 of Regulation D.2 is a regulatory safe harbor for section
4(2).122 It allows sales of an unlimited amount of securities to two classes
of investors: (1) up to thirty-five purchasers each of whom "either alone
or with his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experi-
ence in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the
merits and risks of the prospective investment"; 23 and (2) an unlimited
number of "accredited investors," defined to include mainly institutional
investors and wealthy individuals. 24 A Rule 506 issuer must provide to
nonaccredited purchasers the same information required for Rule 505 of-
ferings. 25 General solicitation of investors and advertising are prohib-
ited, 2' and resale of the securities purchased in a Rule 506 offering is
restricted.12
7
Section 4(6) of the Act also exempts offerings to accredited investors if
the offering amount is not greater than the amount the SEC is allowed to
"a 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
119 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1350-52.
.20 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953).
121 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1995).
'22 Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,106, at 84,919 (Mar. 8, 1982).
512 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1995). Regulation D limits who may act as a purchaser rep-
resentative for purchasers. See Rule 501(h), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(h) (1995).
124 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1995).
121 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2) (1995). See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
226 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1995).
127 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1995).
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exempt under section 3(b) (currently $5 million), and there is no advertis-
ing or public solicitation.128 Rule 506 is available in almost every case in
which section 4(6) would be available, and Rule 506 is generally less re-
strictive. Thus, section 4(6) "is of little, if any, use today."129
Section 3(a)(9) of the Act exempts "any security exchanged by the is-
suer with its existing security holders exclusively where no commission or
other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting
such exchange.''130 The rationale for section 3(a)(9) is, at least in part,
based on the existing security holders' knowledge of the issuer and its
affairs. They may have already received information about the transaction
and, in any event, they are not investing additional money, but merely
changing the form of their investment in an issuer about which they are
presumably already informed."
Another exemption for sales to sophisticated or institutional investors is
Rule 144A." 2 Rule 144A is not, however, an issuer exemption; it exempts
resales of securities after their original purchase from the issuer and is
thus beyond the scope of this Article.
2. The Economics of the Sophisticated Offeree Exemptions
The economic argument for the sophisticated offeree exemptions focuses
on the benefits of registration, which are less for some offerees than for
18 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1994). The definition of "accredited in-
vestor" in § 2(15) of the Act is in two parts. First, certain categories of investors such as banks,
insurance companies, and investment companies are specifically included. Securities Act of 1933
§ 2(15)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15)(i) (1994). Second, the SEC is authorized to include any other person
by rule "on the basis of such factors as financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience
in financial matters, or amount of assets under management." Securities Act of 1933 § 2(15)(ii), 15
U.S.C. § 77b(15)(ii) (1994). The SEC has used this rule-making authority to expand the definition.
See Rule 215, 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1995).
..9 JAMES Cox I T AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 433 (1991).
sI Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1994). The exchange must be exclu-
sively between the issuer and its existing security holders; no new investors may participate in a
§ 3(a)(9) offering. 7A Hscs, supra note 86, § 2.05f1]; Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1232-
33. In addition, the security holders must be exchanging only their existing securities for the new
securities; no new consideration may be required. The SEC only allows cash payments by the security
holders to adjust equitably for dividends or interest paid or payable on the outstanding securities. Rule
149, 17 C.F.R. § 230.149 (1995).
' 7A HICKS, supra note 86, at 2-126 to 2-127. Hicks questions the soundness of this rationale.
7A HIcKs, supra note 86, at 2-127 to 2-133.
.32 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1995).
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others. Certain offerees, because of their sophistication, bargaining power,
and access to information about the issuer, receive less benefit from regis-
tration per dollar invested than do other offerees.laa The nature of the
offerees has little effect on the cost of registration, but due to the reduced
benefit of registration, the cost-benefit tradeoff is different when the offer-
ing is exclusively to sophisticated investors.
Figure C illustrates this point.
133 William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented Contextual
Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311, 353-54 (1984). It is possible, even
probable, that sophisticated investors will be better able to use the information in the registration
statement than unsophisticated investors. However, this does not mean that registration provides
greater benefits to sophisticated investors because they would have better access to information even
without registration. What matters is the comparative benefit-the difference between registration and
no registration. Unsophisticated investors gain more from registration. Unsophisticated investors
would benefit particularly from the standard format, the highlighted risk factors, and the verification
of information that registration provides.
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
FIGURE C
The curves Z400= montThe C jyh TBR and TVo Of ffeinA. They repres e t R are the saomeerig
na~ry offering st the Cota nd e Curves Wihi i
imited to Sonh.. total Cost CUrve total benefit f a Peared in Fig
ever. the ... ticated Oe does not Ch regs ninvestors -. _ benefit of reg.i cs .it is eseta ,g e mnuch If the oqt_ --- t! e.• • , no
Iosa s ben -ssentially the anWregiste,.g S antiall, ,e o n an oo ha e - me as rC i g
registerin Offer, .ess. The curv erig liited at.oo
....d limited to s ,i e  s repres e ophisticattBecause of the r 
"opistcated invesnts the total benefitated investors the efduced benefit, registra tin e samount of the oes not Produce a
i .e ng i s c e a ,13 4 p os i t e o a n Of e r 1-
of registrati . n For an ofre net b.'- L "ig to sdop.-ient. if the toti l far riore tha .erng of that t hen the dorb.. enefit of thn te total benefit at size, the total costS registering Off e n -registrat on to cost
an i To focus soe. On the , ofaerin to sophisticatedIs inefj.
discosur smll op Isicae I ffofferees
SOf&ering exceion exemptions disre ar r -ao po-see oftin sdig ar fo now the possibility of
1996] TRANSACTION EXEMPTIONS IN THE SECURITIES ACT 627
ever exceeds the total cost, it does so only when the dollar amount of the
offering is much greater.13 5
But how much greater? Neither the section 4(2) private offering ex-
emption nor its Rule 506 safe harbor limit the dollar amount of the offer-
ing. This is efficient only if the total benefit of registering an offering to
sophisticated offerees never exceeds the total cost; in other words, only if
TBS and TCR in Figure C never intersect. Whether this is true is an
empirical question. If the total benefit of registration does at some point
exceed the total cost, the sophisticated offeree exemptions are economically
unsound; they should contain a dollar limit above which the exemption is
unavailable and registration is required."3 6
C. Deference Exemptions
1. An Overview of the Deference Exemptions
The rationale for the deference exemptions is that regulation of the of-
fering by some other authority eliminates the need for regulation by the
SEC.1 7 Examples of deference exemptions are the bankruptcy-related ex-
emptions (section 3(a)(7) of the Securities Act""' and sections 1145(a) and
364(0 of the Bankruptcy Code1"'); sections 3(a)(10) 140 and 3(a)(11)141 of
the Securities Act; Rule 147,142 the regulatory safe harbor for section
3(a)(11); and, at least in part, Rule 504 of Regulation D.14 '
Section 3(a)(10) of the Act exempts exchanges of securities that are ap-
proved by a state or federal court or administrative agency after a hearing
.85 This would occur where TBs and TC intersect. In Figure C, the two curves never intersect;
registration of a sophisticated offeree offering never produces a positive net benefit.
... That dollar limit should, of course, be greater than the dollar limit of the small offering
exemptions.
'"s This rationale is not limited to the question of which securities to exempt. The Supreme
Court has looked to the presence or absence of another regulator to help determine whether an invest-
ment is a "security." See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67, 69 (1990); Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters of Am. v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551, 569-70 (1979).
1" 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(7) (1994).
239 11 U.S.C. §§ 1145(a), 364(0 (1994).
"0 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1994).
141 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1994).
142 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1995).
243 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1995).
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on the fairness of the exchange.' The justification for this exemption is
that "the examination and approval by the body in question of the fair-
ness of the issue in question is a substitute for the protection afforded to
the investor by the information which would otherwise be made available
to him through registration.""'
Section 3(a)(11) of the Act and its regulatory safe harbor, Rule 147,14'
provide another deference exemption. Section 3(a)(11) exempts:
Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to
persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer
of such security is a person resident and doing business within or, if
a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State
or Territory. 117
The legislative history of section 3(a)(11) is "sparse,""" but the intent
apparently was to relegate purely local offerings to state regulation." 9 Of
course, states may always regulate securities offerings, whether or not
I" Section 3(a)(10) provides in full:
Except with respect to a security exchanged in a case under title 11, any security which is
issued in exchange for one or more bona fide outstanding securities, claims or property
interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of
such issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness of such terms
and conditions at which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such
exchange shall have the right to appear, by any court, or by any official or agency of the
United States, or by any State or Territorial banking or insurance commission or other
governmental authority expressly authorized by law to grant such approval.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1994). See generally Barbara A. Ash, Reorganizations and Other Ex-
changes Under Section 3(aXlO) of the Securities Act of 1933, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1980).
14 Securities Act Release No. 312, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2181-2184, at 2591 (Mar. 15,
1935).
'4" 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1995).
1l 15 U.S.C. § "77c(a)(11) (1994).
'4 Loss & SFLU;MAN, supra note 2, at 1276.
149 The 1963 Special Study of Securities Markets stated that:
The exemption reflects a congressional policy expressed, in various provisions of the Secur-
ities Act, not to preempt the field of securities regulation or to supersede State control, but
rather to fill the gap in those areas where State regulation cannot adequately meet a na-
tional need ....
It is typically available for the offering by a small businessman of a limited amount of
securities to his friends, relatives, business associates, and others.... Small local offerings
of this character are not a matter of Federal concern, and can be adequately supervised by
State authority to the extent that regulation is deemed necessary.
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND ExCHANGE
COMMIssION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 570, 571 (1963).
1996] TRANSACTION EXEMPTIONS IN THE SECURITIES ACT 629
those offerings are federally exempted. Section 18 of the Securities Act' 50
expressly protects state securities regulation against federal preemption,
and many federally registered offerings are also subject to state registra-
tion.151 The economic argument for federal deference for section 3(a)(11)
offerings is that, because of the especially local nature of the offering, a
single state may regulate and control the offering more effectively than it
could a nationwide offering. Given the enhanced effectiveness of state reg-
ulation of an intrastate offering, the incremental benefits of federal regula-
tion are correspondingly less than they would be for other offerings, even
though those other offerings are also state regulated.
Rule 504 of Regulation D is also at least partially a deference exemp-
tion. The other two Regulation D exemptions, Rules 505 and 506, were
meant to be uniform exemptions from both federal and state registration,
but Rule 504 was not.' 5 2 For offerings falling within Rule 504, "[b]ecause
of the small amount of the offering and the likelihood that sales will occur
in a limited geographic area, the [SEC and the North American Securities
Administrators Association] believe that greater reliance on state securities
laws is appropriate."' Thus, Rule 504 is probably best treated as a hy-
brid small offering/deference exemption.
The federal Bankruptcy Code contains two additional deference exemp-
tions from the Securities Act registration requirements.' 5 4 Section 1145(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code155 exempts from section 5 of the Securities Act' 56
certain offerings of securities of a bankruptcy debtor, an affiliate partici-
pating in a joint plan with the debtor or a successor to the debtor under a
250 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994).
2"' Some federal exemptions, such as Rules 505 and 506, have coordinated state exemptions;
others are purely federal, and the states continue to regulate such offerings. See Securities Act Release
No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,106, at 84,909-84,910 (Mar.
8, 1982). See also 7A HIcKs, supra note 86, § 7.01[3][d].
"I' Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
83,106, at 84,909 (Mar. 8, 1982).
253 Id.
1' For a more extended discussion of these exemptions, see Richard J. Morgan, Application of
the Securities Laws in Chapter 11 Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1983
U. ILL. L. REV. 861, 874-80.
155 11 U.S.C. § 1145(a) (1994).
"' This exemption also applies to any state or local registration requirement.
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plan.157 The offering must be pursuant to a bankruptcy plan and must be
wholly or principally in exchange for existing claims against or interests
in the debtor or the affiliate.""' The bankruptcy court must review and
approve the plan pursuant to which the securities are sold,"5 ' and the
Bankruptcy Code contains its own disclosure requirements for the issu-
ance of such securities.160
The second deference exemption in the Bankruptcy Code is section
364(f),' which is closely related to the exemption in section 3(a)(7) of
the Securities Act. Section 3(a)(7) exempts "[c]ertificates issued by a re-
ceiver or by a trustee or debtor in possession in a case under [the Bank-
ruptcy Code], with the approval of the court."'6 2 It is unclear whether
this is a security exemption or a transaction exemption,"6 " but, whichever
it is, it fits the deference rationale. Section 364(0 of the Bankruptcy Code
exempts from Securities Act registration certain offerings of debt securi-
ties. To the extent that section 364(0 exempts court-approved offerings, it
overlaps the section 3(a)(7) exemption, 64 and it fits the deference ration-
ale. However, section 364(0 also allows the bankruptcy trustee to issue
debt securities without court approval.' To that extent, it goes beyond
section 3(a)(7) and departs from the deference rationale.'
2. The Economics of the Deference Exemptions
The economic rationale for the deference exemptions is more compli-
cated than the rationales for the other two types of exemptions. When a
157 11 U.S.C. § 1145(a)(2) (1994). In addition, if a warrant, option, right to subscribe, or con-
version privilege was issued pursuant to the section 1145(a)(1) exemption, the subsequent offer or sale
of the underlying security is also exempt from registration.
1 11 U.S.C. § 1145(a)(1)(A),(B) (1994).
11 U.S.C. §§ 1128-1129 (1994).
160 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994). See generally Richard L. Epling & Terence W. Thompson, Secur-
ities Disclosure in Bankruptcy, 39 Bus. LAw 855 (1984); Morgan, supra note 154, at 903-10.
11 U.S.C. § 364(f) (1994).
162 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(7) (1994).
RICHARD JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 448 (7th ed.
1992) and authorities cited therein; Morgan, supra note 154, at 878. The accepted view is that it is a
security exemption. JENNINGS ET AL., supra. See also Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1210.
e4 Morgan, supra note 154, at 879-80. For a listing of the differences between the two, see
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1209-10.
"I Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 2, at 1210; Morgan, supra note 154, at 880.
.6 An offering without court approval would fit the deference justification only if the trustee
were considered a neutral official likely to protect the interests of those purchasing the securities.
[Vol. 45
1996] TRANSACTION EXEMPTIONS IN THE SECURITIES ACT 631
deference exemption applies, there are two potential regulators: the SEC
and the other authority to whom the SEC might defer-the alternative
regulator. The economic justification for the deference exemptions is based
on a comparison of the costs and benefits associated with each potential
regulator.
As Table 3 shows, four regulatory options exist: (1) neither the SEC
nor the alternative regulator regulates a particular offering, (2) only the
SEC regulates the offering (an exemption from the alternative regulation),
(3) only the alternative regulator regulates the offering (an exemption
from the Securities Act registration requirement), or (4) both the SEC
and the alternative regulator regulate the offering.
TABLE 3
No Registration Registration
No Alternative
Regulation
Alternative
Regulation
The choice between the first and second options has already been dis-
cussed. The first option-an unregulated offering-results when a small
offering or sophisticated offeree exemption is available. The second op-
tion-Securities Act registration-results when no such exemption is
available. I argued earlier that the second option is preferable to the first
only when the total benefit of registration exceeds the total cost. But this
need not be true for a deference exemption to apply. Deference exemp-
tions can be economically efficient even when Securities Act registration
would produce a positive net benefit. To understand this, consider the
third and fourth options.
The third option is to grant the issuer a deference exemption from the
Securities Act and allow an alternative regulator to regulate the offering.
The alternative regulation would produce its own costs and benefits,
which presumably would differ from the costs and benefits associated with
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
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Securities Act registration. The required disclosure would be different, the
alternative regulator could be more or less efficient than the SEC in re-
viewing the offering, and so on. Regulation by the alternative regulator
(the third option) is preferable to registration with the SEC (the second
option) if the alternative regulation produces a greater net benefit (because
of greater benefits, lower costs, or both) than registration.1"'
The third oplion's superiority to the second option is a necessary, but
not a sufficient, condition to justify a deference exemption. The fourth
option-dual regulation-must also be considered. Assume that regulation
of an offering by an alternative regulator produces greater net benefits
than either registration or a complete exemption from regulation. Then,
the third option is preferable to the first two. In choosing between options
three and four, the question is whether the incremental benefit to investors
of Securities Act registration, given that the alternative regulator is al-
ready acting, exceeds the incremental cost. Let TBsEC equal the additional
incremental benefit of federal registration to investors, given that the alter-
native regulator has acted. And let TCsEc equal the additional cost that
federal registration would entail." 8 If registration results in a positive net
benefit even when the alternative regulator is regulating the offering (in
other words, if TBsEc > TCsgc, then registration is still efficient. Option
four is preferred. If, on the other hand, registration produces a negative
incremental net benefit when the alternative regulator is acting (TBsEc <
'" If the alternative regulation produces greater net benefits for all offerings, then the efficient
result might be to eliminate the Securities Act registration requirement in all cases and rely on the
alternative regulator. However, an alternative regulator might be more efficient for some, but not all,
offerings. The greater net benefit associated with the alternative regulation may be unique to a
particular type of offering. For example, regulation by a single state is effective only for localized,
intrastate offerings. Similar cost savings would not be present if that state tried to regulate a nation-
wide offering. In additon, the alternative regulator may have a comparative advantage over the SEC
only at the margin. Extending the alternative regulator's responsibilities to cover all offerings might
increase the alternative regulator's costs above those associated with registration. Thus, the economic
argument for displacing the SEC in certain cases does not necessarily support the displacement of the
SEC in all cases.
10 Both the cost (TCSEC) and the benefit (TBSEc) should be less than the total cost and benefit
of registration in the absence of an alternative regulator. Some of the legal, accounting, and other
disclosure costs of registration might also be incurred to comply with the alternative regulation. The
incremental cost of registration would not include these costs already incurred. Similarly, the alterna-
tive regulation should produce at least some of the same benefits as registration. Therefore, the incre-
mental benefit of also requiring registration should be less than the total benefit of registration alone.
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TCsEc), option three is preferred, and a deference exemption from Securi-
ties Act registration is economically efficient.
Empirical analysis of the deference exemptions is extremely difficult.
One must determine not only the costs and benefits of registering a partic-
ular offering, but also the costs and benefits of the alternative regulation
and, to evaluate the possibility of dual regulation, the incremental costs
and benefits of registration when the alternative regulator is already act-
ing. I have already discussed the difficulties of measuring the costs and
benefits of registration. Even less is known about the costs and benefits of
a state-regulated intrastate offering, an offering pursuant to a section
3(a)(10) fairness hearing, or an offering of securities in bankruptcy. Thus,
for now, the examination of the deference exemptions must remain fairly
theoretical.
The discussion of the small offering exemptions showed that costs and
benefits vary with the dollar amount of the offering: holding everything
else constant, the net benefit of registration increases as the offering
amount increases. 69 The relationship between net benefits and the dollar
amount of the offering should have no major effect on the choice between
the second option-registration without alternative regulation and the
third option--alternative regulation without registration. The net benefit
of each regulatory system should increase as the dollar amount of the of-
fering increases. As long as the rate of increase is roughly the same for
each regulator, a change in the dollar amount of the offering should not
affect the choice between regulators. If the alternative regulation produces
a higher net benefit than registration, it will continue to produce a higher
net benefit as the dollar amount of the offering changes.
The dollar amount of the offering could affect the choice between op-
tion three-deference to the alternative regulator-and option four-dual
regulation. If, as the dollar amount of the offering increases, the incre-
mental benefit of registration increases more rapidly than the incremental
cost, registration could produce a positive net incremental benefit at some
point. Figure D illustrates this point.
169 See supra text accompanying notes 95-106.
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FIGURE D
TBA
T3SEC
TCSEC
X Y $ Amount
of offering
TBA and TCA represent the total benefit and the total cost of the alterna-
tive regulation. TBSEC and TSEC represent the incremental benefit and
incremental cost of Securities Act registration, given that the alternative
regulator is acting. When the dollar amount of the offering is less than $y,
a deference exemption is preferred to dual regulation. Below this amount,
adding registration to the protection provided by the alternative regulation
would produce a negative net benefit. However, when the amount of the
offering exceeds $y in Figure D, TBSEc exceeds TCsEc, and Securities Act
registration would produce a positive net benefit. Thus, if the incremental
costs and benefits increase like those shown in Figure D as the dollar
amount increases, the deference exemptions should not be absolute; the
dollar amount of the offering should be limited.
None of the deference exemptions depend on the size of the offering;
the dollar amount of the offering is unrestricted. Unlimited deference ex-
emptions like this are economically sound only if the incremental benefit
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of registration never exceeds the incremental cost (that is, if the marginal
incremental benefit of registration as the dollar amount increases is lower
than the marginal incremental cost across the range of possible offerings).
Whether this is true is an empirical question that cannot be answered
with existing data.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON THE NUMBER OF PURCHASERS
Both Rule 505 and Rule 506 of Regulation D are available only if
there are no more than thirty-five nonaccredited purchasers in the offer-
ing.17 0 Other exemptions have no such limits. Is there an economic basis
for limiting the number of purchasers? If so, does it make sense to apply
that limit to some, but not all, of the exemptions? An answer to these
questions requires an examination of how the costs and benefits of regis-
tration are affected by the number of purchasers in the offering.
A. The Number of Purchasers and the Costs of Registration
Some of the costs of registration do not change much, if at all, as the
number of purchasers in any given offering increases. The number of pur-
chasers does not affect the cost of SEC review or the issuer's attorneys' or
accounting fees. The cost of the delay caused by registration is solely a
function of the dollar amount of the offering rather than the number of
purchasers. Similarly, the competitive disadvantage associated with
mandatory disclosure does not depend on the number of purchasers.
Other costs of registration increase as the number of purchasers in-
creases. The more purchasers there are, the greater the cost to print and
deliver prospectuses. 17 The cost of complying with the section 5 restric-
tions on offers and sales also becomes greater as the number of purchasers
increases; with a large number of purchasers, it is more difficult to moni-
170 Rule 505(b)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (1995), and Rule 506(b)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1995), limit the number of purchasers to 35. Rule 501(e), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(e) (1995), excludes accredited investors, among others, in calculating the number of
purchasers.
171 The cost of informing investors increases as the number of purchasers increases, whether or
not the offering is registered. However, everything else being the same, the cost of delivering informa-
tion is higher in a registered offering than in an unregistered offering. Therefore, as the number of
purchasers increases, the total cost of registration associated with informing investors (the increased
cost above the cost in an unregistered offering) also increases.
1996]
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tor the selling group and inadvertent noncompliance becomes more likely.
The Exchange Act periodic reporting, triggered by registration, also be-
comes more costly as the number of purchasers increases because the cost
of distributing those periodic reports increases. At the limit, when there
are fewer than 300 holders of the security after the offering, the periodic
reporting trigger does not apply,172 and there are no Exchange Act costs
at all.
Underwriting fees probably also increase as the number of purchasers
increases. Everything else being equal, it is more costly to solicit and sell
to ten thousand people than to ten. In addition, the liability cost to the
underwriter may increase as the number of investors increases. For any
given offering amount, more purchasers mean a smaller average invest-
ment. Smaller investors are, on average, less sophisticated than larger in-
vestors and thus more likely to be confused or misinformed. To the extent
that this translates into greater liability risk for the underwriters, under-
writing fees should rise when there are more investors. 178
B. The Number of Purchasers and the Benefits of Registration
The total benefit of registration also increases as the number of pur-
chasers increases. This conclusion is not immediately obvious. It seems
that, if registration increases the expected return or reduces the risk of a
security, the resulting gain should be a percentage of the total amount
invested. For example, if registration increases the returns in a $5 million
offering by two percentage points, the gain appears to be $100,000
whether the $5 million is paid by ten investors or ten thousand.
However, this view fails to consider investors' options if the offering is
not registered. In an unregistered offering, each offeree has three options:
(1) refuse to invest, (2) fully investigate the issuer and the offering and
acquire the same information that would be provided in the registration
statement (with the same gains), or (3) invest without acquiring full infor-
mation and bear some or all of the risk that a fuller investigation would
172 Exchange Act §j 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1994).
173 Although investors with larger investments are probably more likely to sue when things go
awry, an aggressive class action practice in securities cases probably counteracts this.
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avoid.1"4 The rational investor will choose the option that results in the
greatest net benefit. An investor will choose to invest (options two and
three) only if the expected net gain from investing exceeds the opportunity
cost of the money invested. The expected net gain from investing equals'
the predicted return of the investment (adjusting for the uncertainty and
expected risk) less the information costs of predicting that return. Option
two involves greater information costs than option three, but it also in-
volves a more certain return (less risk). As between options two and three,
a rational investor will prefer option three and not investigate unless the
investigation and verification costs associated with option two are less than
the gains expected from a more thorough investigation.1 75
If, as indicated in the discussion of the small offering exemptions, the
benefit of having information increases as the size of the investment in-
creases, individuals investing more in an offering are more likely to choose
option two and investigate for themselves. The more money one invests,
the greater the expected loss associated with not investigating. A ten per-
cent risk of loss costs a $1 million investor more than it does a $10,000
investor. The costs of investigation and verification, on the other hand, do
not depend much on the size of one's investment. Thoroughly investigat-
ing an issuer costs as much whether one is investing $10,000 or $1 mil-
lion. Thus, the cost of option two is relatively constant. Therefore, the
greater the amount of one's investment, the greater the net benefit of op-
tion two. At some point, as the size of an individual's investment in-
creases, option two becomes preferable to option three.Y77 Large investors
will fully investigate the issuer themselves rather than bear the risk result-
ing from a lack of information. Smaller investors, however, might find
option three preferable. If transaction costs make collective action by small
investors impossible, it is cheaper for each small investor to suffer the risk
than to investigate the issuer.177 Collectively, the loss to smaller investors
174 The latter two choices are not discrete, but continuous. An investor may acquire and verify
any amount of information from none at all to the amount of verified information in the registration
statement and beyond. Presenting the collection of information as a continuous choice would compli-
cate, but not alter, my discussion of the effect of the number of purchasers.
... Or, viewing the collection and verification of information as a continuous choice, a rational
investor will collect and verify information until the marginal cost of investigation equals the marginal
benefit.
17 See Carney, supra note 133, at 346 n.143 (stating that the marginal gain from investigating
an issuer increases as the size of the investment increases).
177 Carney, supra note 133, at 346, 355.
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may be greater than the cost of investigation and verification, but, for each
individual, the cost of investigation and verification is greater than the
expected loss.
As a result, small investors benefit more from registration than larger
investors. The benefit of registration to all small investors is the sum of
the collective losses they suffer because they do not fully investigate the
issuer. The benefit of registration to larger investors, who investigate the
issuer if the offering is not registered, is the smaller sum of their collective
costs to investigate. If we hold the dollar amount of the offering constant,
the greater the number of investors, the smaller the amount of each per-
son's investment. Because the benefit of registration is inversely correlated
with the size of each person's investment, the greater the number of pur-
chasers in the offering, the greater the benefit of registration.
The benefit of registration increases for another reason as the number
of purchasers increases. The information provided by registration benefits
not only those who purchase in the offering, but also, to some extent, the
secondary trading market, which consists of investors who repurchase
from the offering's original purchasers. The larger the number of pur-
chasers in the original offering, the greater the likelihood of an active sec-
ondary trading market in the securities and the greater the likelihood that
investors trading in the secondary market will benefit from the informa-
tion provided by registration.' In addition, traders in the secondary mar-
ket will benefit from the periodic reporting mandated by section 15(d) of
the Exchange Act.'
However, if an offering is exempt from registration, resale of the secur-
ities without registration by the original purchasers is often restricted. 80
These resale restrictions minimize the costs to secondary traders of not
having the information that registration would have provided and thus
reduce the benefit of registration to secondary traders. As a result, every-
21 This relates to the SEC's concern in limiting the number of purchasers. The release adopting
Rule 146, a predecessor to Regulation D, explained that "the Commission believes that a limitation
on the number of purchasers serves to assure that the offering does not involve or result in a deferred
distribution." Securities Act Release No. 5487, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2710 (Apr. 23, 1974).
... See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
180 See, e.g., Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1995) (nine month limitation on interstate re-
sales); Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1995) (various restrictions on resale). But see, e.g., Rule
504(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (1995) (no restrictions on resale).
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thing else being equal, limitations on the number of purchasers would be
more defensible for exemptions without resale restrictions. However, the
SEC rules are exactly to the contrary. Rules 505 and 506, which restrict
the number of purchasers, are subject to resale restrictions.,,, Rule 504
and Regulation A, which do not restrict the number of purchasers, are not
subject to resale restrictions.182
C. The Net Effect of the Number of Purchasers
As the number of purchasers in an offering increases, the total benefit
of registration increases. But so does the total cost. The net ef-
fect-whether an increase in the number of purchasers increases or de-
creases the net benefit of registration-depends on the relative magnitude
of the two changes. If costs increase more rapidly than benefits as the
number of purchasers increases, the net benefit of registration falls, and
the case for exemption is stronger. If benefits increase more rapidly than
costs as the number of purchasers increases, the net benefit of registration
rises, and the case for exemption is weaker.
Figure E shows the possible relationships among costs, benefits, and the
number of purchasers.
181 Rule 502(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1995).
'8' See supra part III.A.1.
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FIGURE E
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Line TB shows an increase in the total benefits of registration as the
number of purchasers increases (the amount of the offering being held
constant). The two cost curves in Figure E, TCL and TC, illustrate the
two possible relationships between costs and benefits.
TCH shows an increase in the costs of registration as the number of
purchasers increases that is greater than the corresponding increase in
benefits. As the number of purchasers increases, the net benefit of regis-
tration (TB - TCH) decreases. If TCH shows the true relationship between
costs and the number of purchasers, limits on the number of purchasers,
such as those in Rules 505 and 506, would not be efficient. The more
purchasers there are, the stronger the case for exemption. In this scenario,
exemptions for offerings with more than a specified number of purchasers
might be justified. Registration might be efficient for a particular offering
when there are only thirty purchasers but, due to the decreasing net bene-
fit, inefficient when the same offering has three hundred purchasers.
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TCL shows an increase in the costs of registration as the number of
purchasers increases that is lower than the corresponding increase in ben-
efits. As the number of purchasers increases, the net benefit of registration
(TB - TCL) increases. If TCL shows the true relationship between costs
and the number of purchasers, limits on the number of purchasers, such
as those in Rules 505 and 506, could be efficient. The greater the number
of purchasers, the stronger the case for registration. Registration might be
inefficient for a particular offering when there are only thirty purchasers
but, due to the increasing net benefit, efficient when that same offering
involves 300 purchasers.
Unfortunately, prior to this Article, none of the studies of the costs and
benefits of registration have considered the effect of the number of pur-
chasers. As a result, no empirical evidence is available, and it is therefore
impossible to determine whether limits on the number of purchasers in
Rules 505 and 506 are efficient. However, some theoretical observations
can be made about those limits and the lack of purchaser limits in other
exemptions.
1. Small Offering Exemptions
One of the small offering exemptions, Rule 505, is limited to offerings
to no more than thirty-five nonaccredited purchasers. The other small of-
fering exemptions, Rule 504 and Regulation A, contain no such limit.
Two issues arise: (1) whether the thirty-five-purchaser limit in Rule 505
is efficient, and (2) whether there is any justification for treating Rule 505
offerings differently from offerings pursuant to Rule 504 or Regulation A.
a. Rule 505's Thirty-Five-Purchaser Limit
As explained above, the economic efficiency of purchaser limits depends
ultimately on the relative increase in the total benefit and the total cost of
registration as the number of purchasers increases. A limit on the number
of purchasers makes sense only if the net benefit (total benefit minus total
cost) of registration increases as the number of purchasers increases. But,
even if we assume this is true, the thirty-five-purchaser limit in Rule 505
still has a fundamental flaw.
To qualify for the Rule 505 exemption, an offering must meet two con-
ditions: (1) the amount of the offering must not exceed $5 million and (2)
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the number of nonaccredited purchasers must not exceed thirty-five. Fig-
ure F illustrates these two restrictions. The vertical axis represents the
dollar amount of the offering and the horizontal axis represents the num-
ber of purchasers. Any offering with a purchaser/amount combination
that falls within the shaded area is exempt from registration, assuming
that the other requirements of Rule 505 are met. Any offering with a
purchaser/amount combination that falls outside the shaded area must be
registered (assuming that no other exemption is available).
FIGURE F
$5
million
EXEMPT,,
35 No. of
purchasers
Thus, offering A, a $5 million offering to thirty-five purchasers, is ex-
empt. Assume that offering B on Figure F is a $5,001,000 offering to one
purchaser and offering C is a $1000 offering to thirty-six purchasers. Of-
ferings B and C must be registered-B because it is slightly above the $5
million limit and C because it is slightly above the thirty-five-purchaser
limit.
m
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To understand the flaw in Rule 505, assume that the SEC was correct
in making Offering A the largest exempt offering-a $5 million offering
to thirty-five purchasers is the point beyond which the net benefit of regis-
tration exceeds the net benefit of the Rule 505 intermediate disclosure
rule. Offering A should be exempted, but one dollar or one purchaser
more and the net benefit of registration is positive.
If the net benefit of registering Offering A is zero, what does that say
about Offerings B and C? We know that the net benefit of registration
increases as the amount of the offering increases and decreases as the
amount of the offering decreases. And we are assuming that the net bene-
fit of registration increases as the number of purchasers increases and de-
creases as the number of purchasers decreases. Thus, as we move from
point A to point B, the net benefit of registration decreases because the
number of purchasers falls and increases because the offering amount
rises. Because point A represents a net benefit of zero, the net benefit of
registering offering B is positive only if the marginal change that results
from a slight increase in the dollar amount is greater than the marginal
change that results from a drastic decrease in the number of purchasers.
In other words, registration of Offering B is efficient only if the dollar
amount has a greater effect than the number of purchasers on the net
benefit of registration. But consider offering C. As we move from point A
to point C, the net benefit of registration increases because the number of
purchasers rises and decreases because the offering amount falls. Because
point A represents a net benefit of zero, the net benefit of registering Of-
fering C is positive only if the marginal change resulting from a slight
increase in the number of purchasers is greater than the marginal change
resulting from a drastic decrease in the dollar amount. In other words,
registration of Offering C is efficient only if the number of purchasers has
a greater effect than the dollar amount on the net benefit of registration.
But this is exactly the opposite of what was necessary for the registration
of Offering B to be efficient. Thus, if registration of Offering B is effi-
cient, registration of Offering C is inefficient and vice versa.
The flat caps of $5 million and thirty-five purchasers for all offerings
are the problem. Rule 505 does not effectively recognize the offsetting ef-
fects of changes in the offering amount and changes in the number of
purchasers. An offering to thirty-six purchasers must be registered
whether its amount is $50 million or $50,000. An offering of more than
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$5 million must be registered whether it is to one or one hundred pur-
chasers. A sliding scale would be more appropriate. If registration is effi-
cient for a $5 million offering when the number of purchasers exceeds
thirty-five, it might be efficient for a $3 million offering only if there are
more than severity-five purchasers, for a $1 million offering only when
there are more than 150 purchasers, and so on.
b. Rule 505 and the Other Small Offering Exemptions
If a purchaser limit applies to Rule 505 offerings, shouldn't it apply to
all the small offering exemptions? What conceivable justification is there
for limiting Rule 505 offerings to thirty-five purchasers, but not similarly
limiting offerings pursuant to Rule 504 or Regulation A?
(1) Rule 504
Consider first Rule 504. Rule 504 has a $1 million limit, compared to
Rule 505's $5 million limit. This alone could justify a difference in their
respective purchaser limits. We know that, holding everything else con-
stant, the net benefit of registration increases as the dollar amount of the
offering increases. Thus, the net benefit of registering a $5 million Rule
505 offering is greater than the net benefit of registering a $1 million
Rule 504 offering, given that each has the same number of purchasers.
Because of its greater dollar amount, the net benefit of registering a $5
million Rule 505 offering to thirty-five purchasers might be greater than
for a $1 million Rule 504 offering to forty, fifty, or even sixty purchas-
ers."1 3 In fact, if the dollar amount of the offering affects the net benefit of
registration significantly more than the number of purchasers does, it is
possible that registering a $1 million Rule 504 offering (with any reason-
able number of purchasers) would never produce a positive net benefit
even though registering a Rule 505 offering with thirty-six purchasers
would. If so, having a thirty-five-purchaser limit for a $5 million Rule
505 offering and no limit for a $1 million Rule 504 offering could be
efficient.
I Whether this hypothesis is correct depends on the relative effect on net benefits of increasing
the number of purchasers versus increasing the amount of the offering.
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However, the distinction between Rule 504 and Rule 505 suffers from
the same flaws as Rule 505 itself. It fails to account for marginal changes
in the dollar amount of the offering or the number of purchasers. Not all
Rule 505 offerings are for $5 million; the $5 million figure is a cap, not
an absolute requirement. An issuer would prefer to use Rule 504 for of-
ferings of less than $1 million because it is less restrictive, but Rule 505
offerings could range in amount from slightly more than $1 million to the
full $5 million.'" The net benefit of registering a $1.1 million Rule 505
offering to thirty-six purchasers might not be greater than the net benefit
of registering a $1 million Rule 504 offering to 200 purchasers. As indi-
cated earlier, a sliding scale would be more defensible.
(2) Regulation A
The attempted distinction between Rule 504 and Rule 505 was based
on the difference in their maximum dollar amounts. But what about the
difference between Rule 505 and Regulation A? Both are intermediate-
disclosure small offering exemptions limited to offerings of $5 million or
less. Yet, Rule 505 has a thirty-five-purchaser limit, and Regulation A
does not limit the number of purchasers. Is there an economic justification
for this difference?
It is possible, of course, that the SEC is simply being inconsistent. Reg-
ulation A and Regulation D, which contains Rule 505, arose in different
eras and their histories are quite different.185 However, other differences
between the two rules might justify their different treatment of the num-
ber of purchasers. Regulation A issuers must file an offering statement
184 Companies subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act cannot use Rule 504.
Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a)(1) (1995). These companies may use Rule 505 for offerings of less
than $1 million.
295 Regulation A was originally adopted in 1936 and has gone through a number of revisions.
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1322, 1327. It was substantially revised in 1992. See Securities
Act Release No. 6924, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,931 (Mar. 11,
1992) (proposing revisions to Regulation A); Securities Act Release No. 6949, 1982 WESTLAW
188930 (July 30, 1992) (adopting revisions). Regulation D is more recent. It was originally adopted
in 1982 to replace several exemptions that existed at that time. See Securities Act Release No. 6339,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 83,014, at 84,456-84,457 (Aug. 7, 1981)
(proposing Regulation D); Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982).
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and other sales material with the SEC.186 The information provided to
nonaccredited purchasers in a Rule 505 offering does not have to be filed
with the SEC.18 ' SEC review and verification of the disclosure required in
a Regulation A offering could increase the benefit of that information to
investors. If so, for any given number of purchasers, the incremental bene-
fit of registering a Regulation A offering is less than the benefit of regis-
tering a comparable Rule 505 offering. Registration might be justified
when there are thirty-six purchasers in a Rule 505 offering, but not for
the same number of purchasers under Regulation A.
This argument, although plausible, presents several difficulties. First, it
does not justify the complete absence of a limit on the number of purchas-
ers in Regulation A; it merely justifies a higher limit. Even if the benefits
of registering a Regulation A offering are less, as long as benefits increase
faster than costs as the number of purchasers increases, the total benefit of
registration should at some point exceed the total cost. The absence of a
limit on the number of purchasers in Regulation A makes sense only if,
for any likely number of purchasers in a $5 million offering, the incre-
mental benefit of registration never exceeds the cost. 88
The second problem with the distinction between Regulation A and
Rule 505 is that Rule 505 purchasers are subject to resale restrictions and
Regulation A purchasers are not.'89 Therefore, immediate secondary trad-
ing is less likely in a Rule 505 offering. Registration to some extent bene-
fits those in the secondary trading market, and secondary trading becomes
more likely as the number of purchasers increases. Because of this, as the
number of purchasers increases, the benefits of registration should rise
more rapidly for a Regulation A offering than for a Rule 505 offering.
This at least partially offsets any differences in benefits due to SEC re-
view of the Regulation A offering statement.
188 Rule 251(d)(I)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)(i) (1995); Rule 256, 17 C.F.R. § 230.256
(1995).
187 Regulation Ei issuers are required to file a Form D notice, Rule 503(a), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.503(a) (1995), out that form is not an investor-oriented disclosure document. See Form D, 2
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 7341.
188 If, for example, the net benefit of registering a Regulation A offering becomes positive only if
there are 50,000 purchasers, it would be senseless to have a 50,000-purchaser limit if no issuer were
ever expected to make such an offering.
189 Rule 502(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1995).
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A final problem with the argument that the net benefit of registering a
Regulation A offering is less than the net benefit of registering a compara-
ble Rule 505 offering is that it also justifies a difference in the dollar
amounts of the two exemptions. If the net benefit of registering a Rule
505 offering to thirty-five purchasers becomes positive when the amount
of the offering is $5 million, the net benefit of registering a Regulation A
offering to thirty-five purchasers must be less at that point. Registration of
a Regulation A offering would be efficient only if the dollar amount of the
offering was some amount greater than $5 million. The dollar amount of
the Regulation A exemption should, therefore, be greater than the dollar
amount of the Rule 505 exemption. Thus, if the argument supporting the
difference in the number of purchasers succeeds, the identity of the dollar
amounts is wrong. Both aspects of the two exemptions cannot be efficient.
2. Deference and Sophisticated Offeree Exemptions
Another issue is whether it makes sense to limit the number of purchas-
ers in sophisticated offeree or deference exemptions. None of the deference
exemptions limit the number of purchasers, but Rule 506, a sophisticated
offeree exemption, limits the number of nonaccredited purchasers to
thirty-five.
The analysis of deference and sophisticated offeree offerings earlier in
this Article 90 showed that the benefits of registering such offerings gener-
ally are less than the benefits of registration. For sophisticated offeree of-
ferings, this is because sophisticated offerees gain less from registration.
For deference offerings, this is because an alternative regulator protects
investors, and the benefits of registration are only the incremental benefits
above the benefits already provided by the alternative regulator. Thus, for
any given number of sophisticated purchasers (or purchasers protected by
an alternative regulator), the total benefit of registration is less than it
would be for the same number of nonsophisticated purchasers (or pur-
chasers not protected by an alternative regulator).
1 0 See supra parts III.B.2 and III.C.2.
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FIGURE G
$
TB
TC
X No. of
purchasers
Figure G illustrates this point. TB and TC represent the total cost and
total benefit of registration of an offering to nonsophisticated offerees not
protected by an alternative regulator. Registration is efficient when the
number of purchasers exceeds x. If that same offering is limited to sophis-
ticated purchasers (or is protected by an alternative regulator), the total
cost of registration, TC, is roughly the same. However, the total benefit,
TBs, is much less. Now, registration is not efficient when the number of
purchasers is x. At that point, registration still results in a negative net
benefit. If TBs and TC intersect at all, it is not until the number of pur-
chasers is much greater.
This analysis indicates that, even if a purchaser limit is justified for a
Rule 506 offering, it should be greater than the limit in Rule 505. For
offerings with the same dollar amount, the net benefit of registration be-
comes positive with fewer purchasers in a Rule 505 offering than in a
Rule 506 offering. Clearly, one of the two rules is wrong.
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This analysis cannot show whether the sophisticated offeree and defer-
ence exemptions should have limits on the number of purchasers. If the
benefits of registration increase faster than the costs, as the number of
purchasers increases, the TBs and TC curves could intersect at some
point, and registration would be cost effective. An unlimited exemption is
justified only if one of two things is true: (1) For sophisticated offeree and
deference offerings, the costs of registration increase more rapidly than the
benefits as the number of purchasers increases, or (2) Total benefits ex-
ceed total costs only when the number of purchasers is so great that the
limit will never be reached, and therefore no limit is needed.
V. THE ECONOMICS OF INTEGRATION
A. An Introduction to the Integration Doctrine
Special problems arise when a single issuer tries to utilize exemptions
for two or more roughly contemporaneous offerings. Considered sepa-
rately, the cost of registering either offering might exceed the benefit, jus-
tifying either exemption. But the fact that the issuer is making multiple
offerings may affect the relevant costs and benefits. Economies in register-
ing the two offerings together could make the cost of registering both of-
ferings less than the sum of registering either alone. If so, if we consider
the two offerings together, registration might be efficient.
The integration doctrine was developed by the SEC and the courts to
define what constitutes a single, discrete transaction for the purpose of
applying the transaction exemptions.19' The purpose of the doctrine is to
prevent issuers from artificially dividing a single, nonexempt offering into
two or more parts in an attempt to obtain an exemption for one or more
of the parts."9 2 Assume, for example, that an issuer wants to sell $10 mil-
lion worth of securities, half of that amount to unsophisticated investors
residing in the issuer's home state and the other half to sophisticated insti-
tutional investors residing in another state. The sales to the resident unso-
phisticated investors, if considered alone, might qualify for exemption
under section 3(a)(11) of the Act or Rule 147. The sales to the sophisti-
cated investors, if considered alone, might qualify for exemption under
"I1 I HAZEN, supra note 2, at 232.
192 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1211-12; Darryl B. Deaktor, Integration of Securities
Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 465, 473 (1979).
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section 4(2) of the Act or Rule 506. However, no single exemption is
available for the combined offering. To avoid registration, the issuer might
try to separate the single $10 million offering into two separate offerings
and argue that a transaction exemption is available for each one. The
integration doctrine attempts to prevent such manipulation of the transac-
tion exemptions. In essence, it defines what constitutes a single offering. A
transaction exemption is available only if the entire, integrated offering
meets the exemption's requirements.
The SEC takes a two-tiered approach to integration. First, it has devel-
oped a five-factor test to determine whether two or more transactions
should be integrated and treated as a single offering. This five-factor test
is discussed in part V.A.1. Second, the SEC has adopted several safe-har-
bor rules that protect offerings from integration if certain conditions are
met. If a safe-harbor rule protects two offerings from integration, the five-
factor test is not applied. The various integration safe-harbors are briefly
discussed in part V.A.2.
Integration should not be confused with a related concept known as
aggregation. The concept of aggregation is used in the small offering ex-
emptions to determine the dollar amount of the offering. In some cases,
securities sold in other offerings may have to be included in that dollar
amount, thus reducing the available amount, even if the other offerings
would be treated as discrete under the integration doctrine. The concept of
aggregation is discussed in part V.B.
In part V.C, I turn to the economics of the integration doctrine and
analyze the effect of multiple offerings on the costs and benefits of
registration.
1. The Five-Factor Test
The integration doctrine was developed shortly after the Securities Act
was enacted. In late 1933, the Federal Trade Commission, which at the
time was charged with enforcement of the Act, ruled that an issuer could
not sell part of an issue using the intrastate offering exemption and then
sell the rest of the issue in an interstate, registered public offering."9 3 The
... Securities Act Release No. 97 (Dec. 28, 1933), 11 Fed. Reg. 10949, 10950 (Sept. 27, 1946),
reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 1027.
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issue arose in several subsequent SEC releases and proceedings,"" but the
SEC did not formally articulate a standard for integrating offerings until
1961.19' This now well-known five-factor test considers whether:
(1) the different offerings are part of a single plan of financing;
(2) the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security;
(3) the offerings are made at or about the same time;
(4) the same type of consideration is to be received in each offering;
[and]
(5) the offerings are made for the same general purpose. 196
The exact meaning of each of these factors has never been totally
clear. 197 The two SEC releases that established the five-factor test made
no attempt to explain it,"'8 and subsequent SEC interpretations have been
confusing. 99 Not all of the factors must be present to integrate two offer-
ings,'00 and two of the factors-whether there is a single plan of financing
and whether the offerings are for the same general purpose-are gener-
ally given greater weight than the others.20 1 These two factors tend to
overlap.202 To the extent there is a difference, "plan of financing" refers
to things like "the method of offering the security, the timing of plans for
raising capital, and whether the offerings are financially interdepen-
dent."-203 The intent of the issuer at the time of the first offering may be
determinative in deciding whether a single plan of financing was contem-
14 See Securities Act Release No. 2029, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 2140 (Aug. 8, 1939);
Herbert R. May, 27 S.E.C. 814, 818-20 (1948); Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 625 (1938); Peter-
sen Engine Co., 2 S.E.C. 893, 903 (1937).
... Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2270-2277, at 2272 (Dec.
6, 1961).
'9' Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2770-2783, at 2781 (Nov.
6, 1962). Accord, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77 2270-2277, at 7
2272 (Dec. 6, 1961).
... For a good discussion of the meaning of the five factors, see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2,
at 1211-22.
"I See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1211-22.
... See infra text accompanying notes 250-54.
o Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1222.
"o Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1222.
101 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1214-15; Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities
Offerings: A Proposed Formula That Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 Loy. U. CH.
L.J. 199, 213 (1994).
1'3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1214; Wade, supra note 202, at 211.
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plated.2" 4 The purpose factor refers more to the use of the proceeds-the
project or projects for which the funds are needed.2 5 The "same class of
security" factor is also important. When different classes of securities are
offered, the courts and the SEC generally will not integrate, even if the
differences between the two classes are small.206 The "same type of con-
sideration" factor has rarely been a significant reason for integrating two
offerings, because most offerings are for cash.20 7 However, different types
of consideration have been cited to justify not integrating two offerings. 20 8
The meaning oF the timing factor is self-evident. 20 9 It is unclear exactly
how close in time two offerings must be,210 but a six-month separation
may create a presumption against integration.1
2. Integration Safe Harbors
The SEC has also adopted several rules that provide safe harbors from
integration. Integration safe harbors appear in Rule 152, Rule 147, Regu-
lation D, Regulation A, Regulation S, Rule 701, and Rule 144A. If a safe
harbor protects an offering from integration, the five-factor test does not
apply. However, the safe harbors are not exclusive. Offerings which do
not fall within an integration safe harbor are not automatically integrated,
but are subject to the usual five-factor analysis. 212
204 Cox ET AL., supra note 129, at 436-37; Wade, supra note 202, at 212-13.
'05 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1214.
o Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1219-20; Wade, supra note 202, at 217.
207 Cox ET AL., supra note 129, at 437; Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1222.
20" Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1222; Wade, supra note 202, at 218.
209 The availability of the integration safe harbors, discussed below, turns mainly on the amount
of time separating two offerings. See infra Part V.A.2.
210 Kathryn Frame, Note, Securities Regulation: Integration of Securities Offerings, 34 OKLA.
L. REv. 864, 876 (1981).
21 Cox ET AL., supra note 129, at 437.
212 For example, a note to the Rule 502(a) integration safe harbor in Regulation D provides:
If the issuer offers or sells securities for which the safe harbor rule in paragraph (a) of this
Rule 502 is unavailable, the determination as to whether separate sales of securities are
part of the same offering (i.e. are considered "integrated") depends on the particular facts
and circumstancs ....
The following factors should be considered in determining whether offers and sales
should be integrated for purposes of the exemptions under Regulation D:
(a) Whether he sales are part of a single plan of financing;
(b) Whether the sales involve issuance of the same class of securities;
(c) Whether the sales have been made at or about the same time;
(d) Whether the same type of consideration is being received; and
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a. Rule 152
Rule 152,213 adopted in 1935,214 was the SEC's first integration safe
harbor. It protects section 4(2) private offerings from integration if "sub-
sequently thereto the issuer decides to make a public offering and/or files
a registration statement." 2 5 In a series of no-action letters, the SEC staff
has held that Rule 152 applies when an issuer files a registration state-
ment after a section 4(2) private offering is completed or abandoned even
if the public offering was already contemplated when the private offering
was initiated.2 6 Rule 152 applies even if the section 4(2) securities are
not issued until after the public offering, as long as the decisions to invest
were made before the public offering.217
b. Rule 147
Rule 147, the intrastate offering safe harbor, contains an integration
safe harbor. Rule 147(b)(2) establishes a six-month envelope before and
after the Rule 147 offers and sales.218 The safe harbor protects the Rule
(e) Whether the sales are made for the same general purpose. See Release No. 33-4552
(November 6, 1962).
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a), note (1995). See also 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.147(b)(2), note (1995);
230.251(c)(2), note (1995).
213 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1995).
"' See Securities Act Release No. 305 (Mar. 2, 1935), reprinted in Lyman Johnson & Steve
Patterson, The Reincarnation of Rule 152: False Hope on the Integration Front, 46 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 539, 582 (1989).
2" Rule 152, 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1995). For a detailed analysis of the Rule 152 safe harbor,
see Johnson & Patterson, supra note 214.
216 See, e.g., Vulture Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,407 (Dec. 31, 1986); BBI Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WESTLAW
67522 (Nov. 28, 1986). For a detailed discussion of these and other, similar no-action letters, see
Johnson & Patterson, supra note 214, at 556-61.
" Black Box, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,510, at 77,579 (June 26, 1990). For a more extensive discussion of the Black Box letter and its
implications, see Gerald Backman & Robert Gervis, Integration Revisited: The Black Box Restruc-
turing, 5 INSIGHTS No. 2 (Feb. 1991).
... Rule 147(b)(2) provides:
For purposes of this rule only, an issue shall be deemed not to include offers, offers to sell,
offers for sale or sales of securities of the issuer pursuant to the exemption provided by
section 3 or section 4(2) of the Act or pursuant to a registration statement filed under the
Act, that take place prior to the six month period immediately preceding or after the six
month period immediately following any offers, offers for sale or sales pursuant to this
rule, provided, that, there are during either of said six month periods no offers, offers for
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147 offering against integration with registered or exempted offers and
sales outside the envelope. However, the Rule 147(b)(2) safe harbor is not
available, even for offers and sales outside the envelope, if any securities of
the same or a similar class as those in the Rule 147 offering are offered or
sold within the envelope.219
c. Regulation D
Regulation El's integration safe harbor is similar to that in Rule 147.
That safe harbor, Rule 502(a), also establishes a six-month envelope
before and after the Regulation D offers and sales.220 Offers and sales
outside that envelope which are registered or exempted from registration
will not be integrated into the Regulation D offering. As with Rule
147(b)(2), the safe harbor is usually not available if securities of the same
or a similar class to those being offered in the Regulation D offering are
sold within the envelope.22'
d. Regulation A
Regulation A contains the SEC's most recent integration safe harbor,
added in 1992 when the SEC substantially revised the Regulation A ex-
emption. 222 This safe harbor, Rule 251(c), 223 protects three categories of
offerings from integration with Regulation A offerings:
sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer of the same or similar class as those offered,
offered for sale or sold pursuant to the rule.
17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b)(2) (1995).
219 Id.
220 Rule 502(a) provides:
All sales that are part of the same Regulation D offering must meet all of the terms and
conditions of Regulation D. Offers and sales that are made more than six months before
the start of a Regulation D offering or are made more than six months after completion of
a Regulation D offering will not be considered part of that Regulation D offering, so long
as during those six month periods there are no offers or sales of securities by or for the
issuer that are of the same or a similar class as those offered or sold under Regulation D,
other than those offers or sales of securities under an employee benefit plan as defined in
rule 405 under the Act.
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1995).
221 The Rule 502(a) safe harbor remains available if the offers or sales within the envelope are
pursuant to an employee benefit plan. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1995).
222 See Securities Act Release No. 6949, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 72,439 (July 30, 1992).
222 Rule 251(c) provides:
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(1) all offers or sales prior to the Regulation A offering;224
(2) offers or sales made more than six months after the completion of
the Regulation A offering;225 and
(3) even within the six-month period, subsequent offers or sales that are
registered, in reliance on the Rule 701 exemption, pursuant to an em-
ployee benefit plan, or in reliance on Regulation S.226
e. Rule 701
Rule 701 exempts offerings pursuant to certain compensatory benefit
plans or compensation contracts. It contains an exceptionally broad inte-
gration safe harbor. Rule 701(b)(6) protects the Rule 701 offering from
integration with "any other offering or sale whether registered under the
Act or otherwise exempt from the registration requirements of the Act."221 7
f Regulation S
Regulation S exempts certain offerings of securities to persons outside
the United States when there are no selling efforts within the United
Integration with Other Offerings. Offers and sales made in reliance on this Regulation A
will not be integrated with:
(1) prior offers or sales of securities; or
(2) subsequent offers or sales of securities that are:
(i) registered under the Securities Act, except as provided in [Rule
254(d)];
(ii) made in reliance on [Rule 701];
(iii) made pursuant to an employee benefit plan;
(iv) made in reliance on Regulation S [Rules 901-904]; or
(v) made more than six months after the completion of the Regula-
tion A offering.
17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c) (1995). For a detailed analysis of the Regulation A integration provisions, see
C. Steven Bradford, Regulation A and the Integration Doctrine: The New Safe Harbor, 55 OHmo ST.
L.J. 255 (1994).
"' Rule 251(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(1) (1995).
... Rule 251(c)(2)(v), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(2)(v) (1995).
2. Rule 251(c)(2)(i)-(iv), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(2)(i)-(iv) (1995). The provision protecting
subsequent registered offerings from integration states that this protection is available "except as pro-
vided in [Rule 254(d)]." Id. § 230.251(c)(2)(ii). Rule 254(d) applies only when an issuer has begun
to solicit interest in a Regulation A offering, as allowed by Rule 254, and decides to abort the Regula-
tion A offering and register the offering instead. Rule 254(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(d) (1995). The
interaction of Rule 251(c) and Rule 254(d) is explained in Bradford, supra note 223, at 281-83.
2. Rule 701(b)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(b)(6) (1995).
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States.22' Regulation S has no formal integration safe harbor, but the SEC
has long taken the position that it will not integrate domestic offerings
with simultaneous offerings made abroad solely to foreign investors.229
However, the SEC has indicated that this nonintegration position is only
a "general view" and that "the parameters of the nonintegration position
will continue to be developed through the no-action and interpretive pro-
cess.'" ° Thus, 1:he protection against integration is not as strong as that
provided by an actual integration safe harbor.
g. Rule 144A
Rule 144A, which exempts resales of previously issued securities to
qualified institutional buyers,23' also contains an integration safe harbor.
Rule 144A(e) provides: "Offers and sales of securities pursuant to this
section shall be deemed not to affect the availability of any exemption or
safe harbor relating to any previous or subsequent offer or sale of such
securities by the issuer or any prior or subsequent holder thereof."2 2 The
Rule 144A(e) integration safe harbor may in limited cases protect an orig-
inal offering of securities by an issuer from integration with other offer-
2s See Rules 901-904, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.904 (1995). See also supra text accompanying
notes 93-94.
"2 In Securities Act Release No. 4708, issued in 1964, the SEC indicated that § 4(2) private
offerings would not be integrated with foreign offerings. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domes-
tic Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 4708, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1361-1363 (July 9, 1964).
See also College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,503 (June 4, 1987); College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-
Action Letter, 1987 WESTLAW 107585 (Feb. 18, 1987). A note to Rule 502(a) of Regulation D
extended this protection from integration to Regulation D offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a), note
(1995). A 1992 amendment to Regulation A extended this protection to Regulation A offerings. Rule
251(c)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(2)(ii) (1995). No-action letters extended this general
nonintegration policy to domestic offerings under § 3(a)(11) and Rule 147 and to domestic registered
offerings. See Commonwealth Equity Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,412 (Jan. 20, 1987); Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985
WESTLAW 54381 (June 5, 1985); Scientific Mfg., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1983-1984 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 77,505 (May 12, 1983); Williams Island Assoc., Ltd., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1983 WESTLAW 28343 (May 4, 1983).
220 Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6779, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,242, at 89,126 (June 10, 1988).
... Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1995).
'3' Rule 144A(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(e) (1995). For a detailed analysis of the Rule 144A(e)
integration safe harbor, see C. Steven Bradford, Rule 144A and Integration, 20 SEc. REo. L.J. 37
(1992).
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ings.2 3 However, Rule 144A and its integration safe harbor deal primar-
ily with resales and are therefore beyond the scope of this Article.
B. Aggregation
The integration doctrine should not be confused with a related concept
known as aggregation, which relates to the dollar amount limits in the
small offering exemptions. The small offering exemptions are available
only if the offering does not exceed the maximum aggregate offering
price.234 If an offering exceeds the maximum amount, the exemption is
lost for the entire offering, not just for those securities sold after the maxi-
mum is reached.23 5
The "aggregation" provisions of Regulation A and Rules 504 and 505
of Regulation D require that the maximum dollar amount available be
reduced by the amount of other specified sales of securities. Rule 504, for
example, provides for a maximum aggregate offering price of $1 million,
"less the aggregate offering price for all securities sold within the twelve
months before the start of and during the offering of securities under this
[Rule 504], in reliance on any exemption under section 3(b), or in viola-
tion of section 5(a) of the Securities Act."'286 Rule 505's aggregation provi-
sion is similar.2"' Regulation A used to contain similar language,238 but it
238 See Bradford, supra note 232, at 53-57.
, See Rule 251(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (1995); Rule 504(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2)
(1995); Rule 505(b)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i) (1995).
"' Both Regulation A and Regulation D have substantial compliance rules that limit the nega-
tive effects of insignificant deviations from the requirements of the exemptions. See Rule 260, 17
C.F.R. § 230.260 (1995); Rule 508, 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (1995). However, neither of those rules
covers an excessive aggregate offering price. Rule 260(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.260(a)(2) (1995); Rule
508(a)(2), 17 C.F.R § 230.508(a)(2) (1995).
2"' Rule 504(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (1995).
M Rule 505(b)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i) (1995).
218 Prior to the 1992 amendments, Regulation A provided that the aggregate offering price
should be calculated including
The aggregate offering price of all securities of the issuer offered or sold pursuant to ...
[Regulation A] .. . and any other securities offered or sold within 1 year prior to the
commencement of the proposed offering pursuant to any other exemption under section
,3(b) of the Act or in violation of section 5(a) of the Act.
17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a)(1) (1991) (amended 1992).
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was amended in 1992 to provide that only sales pursuant to Regulation A
reduce the allowable aggregate offering price.2 39
Integration and aggregation, although related, are quite distinct. The
aggregation rules apply whether or not the two offerings would be inte-
grated. 40 Aggregation has some, but not all, of the consequences of inte-
gration. In effect, the two offerings are considered a single offering only
for the purpose of calculating the dollar amount. If the two offerings to-
gether exceed the allowable dollar amount, there is a violation. However,
if the two offerings do not exceed the maximum dollar amount, it is irrele-
vant that the prior, aggregated offering does not meet other requirements
of the exemption.
C. The Economics of Integration
1. Introduction
The SEC has paid little or no attention to the economics of the integra-
tion doctrine. It has instead tried to define the concepts "offering" and
"part of an issue" metaphysically.2 4 This misdirected focus is unfortunate
because the economic model developed in this Article provides several in-
sights into the integration problem. In some instances, the SEC's approach
makes sense; in other instances, it does not.
2. The Integration of Sophisticated Offeree Offerings With Other
Offerings
Consider first the sophisticated offeree exemptions. The economic argu-
ment for the sophisticated offeree exemptions depends on the reduced ben-
29 The aggregate offering price for Regulation A offerings is $5 million, "less the aggregate
offering price for all securities sold within the twelve months before the start of and during the offer-
ing of securities in reliance upon Regulation A." 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (1995). "Use of other 'small
issues' exemptions would not reduce the Regulation A dollar ceiling." Small Business Initiatives, Se-
curities Act Release No. 6924, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,931, at
82,485 (Mar. 11, 1992). Accord, Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, 1992
WESTLAW 188930 (July 30, 1992).
E.g., Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6455, 1983
WESTLAW 35560, "18 (Mar. 3, 1983).
..1 E.g., Refunding Issues, Securities Act Release No. 2029, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2140
(Aug. 8, 1939); Exemption for Local Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 4434, id. at 2271 (Dec.
6, 1961); Securities Act Release No. 4552, id. at 2770 (Nov. 6, 1962).
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efits that registration provides to the offerees.242 Because the benefits of
registration are less, the total benefit of registration does not exceed the
total cost.
The sophisticated offeree exemptions have no dollar amount limita-
tions.24 For this to be efficient, the total benefit of registration must never
exceed the total cost, no matter how large the offering. The failure to cap
the dollar amount of sophisticated offeree offerings may be a mistake.244
Registration of a sophisticated offeree offering may be efficient once the
offering exceeds some maximum dollar amount. If so, sophisticated offeree
offerings should be treated like any other offering for integration pur-
poses.24 But assume that the sophisticated offeree exemptions are struc-
tured properly; assume, in other words, that the total benefit of registra-
tion never exceeds the total cost. Then, the effect on integration is clear
and categorical: a sophisticated offeree offering should never be integrated
with any other offering. The presence of other offers or sales should not
affect the sophisticated offeree exemptions.
a. Two Sophisticated Offeree Offerings
It is easy to see why integration of one sophisticated offeree offering
with another sophisticated offeree offering should not eliminate either ex-
emption. Considering the two offerings as one merely increases the dollar
amount of the offering. Nothing else changes. The offerees in the com-
bined, integrated offering would still be sophisticated, and the cost and
benefit curves would not change in any way. If the amount of the offering
does not affect the economics of the sophisticated offeree exemptions, the
total cost of registration would still exceed the total benefit, even after
integration.
242 See supra part III.B.2.
' The § 4(6) accredited investor exemption is limited to offerings whose aggregate offering
price does not exceed the cap on the SEC's exemptive authority in § 3(b) (now $5 million). See
Securities Act of 1933 §§ 4(6), 3(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(6), 77c(b) (1994). However, as I explained
earlier, § 4(6) is an anachronism which has been displaced by Rule 506 of Regulation D. See supra
text accompanying notes 128-29. Thus, the cap is ineffective.
24 See supra text accompanying note 136.
2' See infra part V.C.3.
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Figure H illustrates this point. TC and TB are the total cost and total
benefit of registering a sophisticated offeree offering. TB is never greater
than TO, no matter what the dollar amount.
FIGURE H$
TC
T B
x y (x+Y) $ Amount
of offering
Assume that odne offering, in the amount of $x, qualifies for a sophisti-
cated offeree exemption if considered alone. The total cost of registration
exceeds the total benefit; considering this offering in isolation, registration
is inefficient. Assume that a second offering, in the amount of $y, also
qualifies for a sophisticated offeree exemption if considered by itself. At
$y, the total cost of registration exceeds the total benefit so registration of
the second offering is also inefficient. If the two offerings are integrated
and considered as a single offering, the dollar amount of the combined
offering is $(x 4 y). But the dollar amount is all that is affected. The
total cost and total benefit curves are unchanged; combining the two offer-
ings is simply a move along those curves. If, as hypothesized, total benefits
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never exceed total costs, no matter how large the offering, registration is
still inefficient. Integration has no effect.
b. A Sophisticated Offeree Offering and Another Type of Offering
It also is not economically efficient to require registration when a so-
phisticated offeree offering is made contemporaneously with some other
type of exempted offering. However, this conclusion is evident only when
the marginal costs and benefits of registration per dollar amount of the
offering are considered.
We are assuming that, for any dollar amount, the total cost of registra-
tion for a sophisticated offeree offering exceeds the total benefit. If this is
true, then the marginal cost of registration for each additional dollar
raised is probably greater than the marginal benefit.24 If the marginal
benefit were greater than the marginal cost as the dollar amount in-
246 Technically, marginal cost (MC) does not have to exceed marginal benefit (MB) at all points
in order for total cost (TC) always to exceed total benefit (TB). Consider, for example, the following
MC and MB curves:
FIGURE I
$1
of offering
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creased, the total benefit of registration would eventually exceed the total
cost.
This marginal analysis makes it clear why integration with other offer-
ings should not eliminate a sophisticated offeree exemption. Assume that
an offering to sophisticated offerees is made at the same time as an offer-
ing pursuant to some other exemption-for instance, a small offering.
Figure J shows the cost and benefit curves for the small offering, consid-
ered by itself.
FIGURE J
$1
$ Amount
of offering
The total benefit of registration exceeds the total cost only when the dollar
amount of an offering exceeds $x. Because we are assuming the small
offering is exempt, it must be for less than $x. Assume that the dollar
amount of the small offering is $y.
The MC curve dips bflow the MB curve for certain offering amounts, but, as long as the cross-
hatched area is larger than the shaded area, TC will always exceed TB.
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What happens when we combine this small offering with a sophisti-
cated offeree offering and treat them as one? The fixed costs of registra-
tion are already factored into the TC curve in Figure J; we do not need to
add them again to compute the total cost of registering the combined offer-
ing. When we add the sophisticated investors to the small offering repre-
sented in Figure J, the only additional costs and benefits of registration
would be the marginal costs and benefits associated with the additional
sophisticated investors. Because the marginal costs of registration exceed
the marginal benefits for sophisticated offerees, adding them to the small
offering should not change the result. The total cost of registration will
still exceed the total benefit. Figure K illustrates this result.
FIGURE K
combined $ Amount
of offering
The cost and benefit curves up to dollar amount $y are the total cost and
total benefit for the small offering. After $y, the total cost and total benefit
curves increase by the marginal cost and benefit for sophisticated offerees.
Because this marginal cost is greater than the marginal benefit, the total
cost of registration for the combined offering still must exceed the total
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benefit. Even when we consider the offerings together, registration is not
efficient. 2
417
The result would be the same if the offering to nonsophisticated offer-
ees was a registered offering-if the issuer simultaneously made both a
registered public offering and a sophisticated offeree offering. Assume,
consistent with :he initial assumption in this Article, that registering the
public offering alone results in a positive net benefit. Because the margi-
nal cost of registering an offering to sophisticated offerees exceeds the
marginal benefit, the marginal net benefit of including the sophisticated
offerees in the registration has to be negative. Combining the two offer-
ings in a registration thus produces a lower net benefit than registering
the public offering alone. Therefore, it is not efficient to register the so-
phisticated offeree offering; it should retain its exemption.
3. The Integration of Two Small Offerings
The question of whether to integrate two small offerings seems decep-
tively simple: Total the dollar amounts of the two offerings and require
registration if the combined dollar amount exceeds the offering amount at
which the total benefit of registration exceeds the total cost. Unfortu-
nately, the issue is more complicated than that. The simple approach
works only if the two small offerings are virtually identical in all respects.
24 The SEC has implicitly recognized this view, but not in the context of initial offerings by
issuers. Resales of securities to qualified institutional buyers, who are sophisticated investors, are
given extensive protection from integration. See Rule 144A(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(e) (1995).
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FIGURE L$
TBR
TC
Y $X z $ Amount
of offering
Figure L is based on Figure B, the earlier graphical examination of the
small offering exemptions. TBR and TCR represent the total cost and total
benefit of registration for any given offering amount. TB, and TC re-
present the total cost and total benefit of an intermediate disclosure small
offering exemption like Rule 505. I previously showed that it is efficient
to fully exempt from registration offerings whose dollar amount is less
than Sy, to allow the intermediate exemption for offerings whose dollar
amount is between $y and $z, and to require the registration of offerings
whose dollar amount exceeds $z.
Assume now that an issuer engages in two separate small offerings,
each with a dollar amount less than $y. Considered alone, either one
should be exempt from registration (and from intermediate disclosure) be-
cause the total cost of registration (and of intermediate disclosure) exceeds
the total benefit. But what happens when we consider the two small offer-
ings together? The simplest approach would be to add the dollar amounts
1996]
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of the two offerings. If their combined dollar amount is less than $y, they
should be exempted from registration. If their combined dollar amount is
between $y and $z, registration should not be required, but they should be
relegated to an intermediate disclosure exemption. If their combined dollar
amount exceeds $z, registration should be required.
This simple approach is easy, theoretically plausible, and, in some
cases, demonstrably incorrect. It assumes that the costs and benefits of
registering the two offerings are perfectly additive-that combining the
two offerings merely moves one along the TB and TC curves and does not
change the shapes of the curves in any significant way. This assumption is
justifiable if the two small offerings are roughly identical. However, if the
two offerings are: dissimilar in important ways, registering the combined
offering could produce a lower net benefit than the simple, additive view
would suggest.
Surprisingly, the much-maligned five-factor integration test developed
by the SEC helps to determine when the additive view is likely to be
correct and when, because of differences between the two offerings, inte-
gration makes less sense.248 All five factors have at least some relevance to
the costs and benefits of registering the combined offering.
Consider first the "same class of security" factor. If the two offerings
involve different securities with different rights, the economies of scale in
registration are less than if both offerings involve the same security. Dif-
ferent disclosure will have to be provided in discussing the rights and lia-
bilities of each class of security. There is a corresponding reduction in
benefit to investors. If the two securities have greatly different rights, in-
vestors might be confused by a common registration statement. Because of
this confusion, the benefit to investors of common registration is less per
dollar invested than if each offering involved the same security. Because
costs are higher and benefits are lower, the net benefit of common regis-
tration is less when the two offerings do not involve the same class of
security.
"'8 I do not mean to suggest that the five-factor test was based on economic analysis. The five
factors were proposed a; a way to answer the metaphysical question of what an "offering" was; no
economic rationale was offered. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
I also do not claim that the five-factor test is a complete way of measuring costs and benefits for
integration purposes, only that the five factors have some relevance.
[Vol. 45
1996] TRANSACTION EXEMPTIONS IN THE SECURITIES ACT 667
The analysis of the "same general purpose" factor is similar. If the two
offerings have wholly different purposes, the costs of disclosure will be
slightly higher than they would be if the proceeds of the two offerings
were to be used on the same project. Each project must be disclosed sepa-
rately, even in a combined registration statement. Thus, the cost reduction
in combining the two into a single registration statement is not as great.
On the benefit side, the same potential for confusion exists. Investors
might confuse the two projects, producing lower benefits per dollar in-
vested than if each offering was for the same purpose.
The "same consideration" factor has a similar effect on the costs and
benefits of registration. If materially different types of consideration are
given by investors in the two offerings, separate disclosure will be re-
quired. And investors might be confused about matters that turn on con-
sideration, such as expected returns and the dilutive effects of the offering.
The "single plan of financing" factor often serves merely as a surrogate
for other factors, especially the "same or similar purpose" factor. To the
extent that this is true, the previous discussion applies to it as well. But
the analysis of the "single plan of financing" factor also focuses on the
intent of the offeror: when the offeror initiated the first offering, was the
second offering planned as part of the same financing plan? This focus on
the issuer's intent also fits the cost-benefit analysis. If the second offering
was already planned or anticipated at the time of the first offering, the
issuer could have registered the two offerings together. If the second offer-
ing was not planned or anticipated at the time of the first offering, the cost
savings associated with combining the two could not have been achieved.
Registration of the combined offering simply was not a possibility. At the
time of the first offering, the issuer could not register a second offering
which the issuer did not yet contemplate making. At the time of the sec-
ond offering, the choice is only between registering the second offering
alone or exempting it. If the second offering considered alone qualifies for
an exemption, integration is inefficient. The economies of scale that the
integration doctrine contemplates could not occur in this context. Integra-
tion in this context imposes an additional cost on issuers whenever they
engage in an exempted offering of securities: the risk that an unexpected
future offering may have to be registered. This additional cost of registra-
tion has no corresponding benefit.
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The fifth factor, whether the offerings are at or about the same time,
raises similar concerns. To some extent, separation in time is a proxy for
the intent part of the "single plan of financing" test. The further apart in
time two offerings are, the less likely it is that the second offering was
anticipated at the time of the first and the weaker the argument for econo-
mies of scale in registering the combined offering. However, the time be-
tween the two offerings also affects the cost-benefit tradeoff in other ways.
A substantial delay between two offerings increases the cost of registering
them together because the information in the registration statement could
be stale by the time of the second offering. The issuer would have to up-
date the information for the second offering or possibly substitute a new
prospectus. Thus, the reduction in costs due to combining the offerings is
not as great as it would be if the two offerings were simultaneous. If
updating is not required, costs are minimized, but only by reducing the
benefits of registration. The less current the information, the less investors
in the second offering benefit. Thus, the greater the delay between the two
offerings, the smaller the net benefit of registering the combined offering
and the weaker the argument that registration is efficient.
Economic theory cannot indicate exactly how far apart in time two of-
ferings must be before integration is no longer justified. There is nothing
magical about the six-month period in most of the integration safe
harbors. Depending on how much the net benefit of registration changes
as the time between two offerings increases, either a longer or a shorter
period might be justified. 49 The SEC certainly has not offered any eco-
nomic justification for the six-month period. However, this analysis does
support the concept, if not the exact time limit, of the SEC's temporal safe
harbors. If a significant period of time separates two offerings, they should
not be integrated.
Thus, the five factors considered by the SEC in deciding whether to
integrate offerings have some justification in economic theory. However,
the application of' the five-factor test in practice has been less than opti-
mal. One problem is that the test itself is uncertain and poorly defined. 250
"0 See Deaktor, supra note 192, at 517-18 (arguing for a 90-day integration safe harbor); Perry
E. Wallace, Jr., Integration of Securities Offerings: Obstacles to Capital Formation Remain for
Small Businesses, 45 WlASH. & LEE L. REv. 935, 972-73 (1988) (suggesting that a three-month
interval would benefit small businesses).
'0 I HAZEN, supra note 2, at 233; Frame, supra note 210, at 865.
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Neither the SEC nor the courts "have ever adequately articulated how
these factors are to be weighed or how many factors must be present in
order for integration to occur."251 To further complicate matters, SEC no-
action letters interpreting the five-factor test are confusing and sometimes
inconsistent.2 52 An American Bar Association subcommittee labelled the
no-action letters dealing with integration "difficult to reconcile even when
dealing with similar fact situations involving the same subject matter." '253
According to one author, the integration doctrine "frustrate[s] issuers en-
gaged in the capital formation process, engulfing them in a sea of ambigu-
ity, uncertainty, and potential liability.) 254
The uncertainty of the five-factor test is costly. It increases the risk to
issuers, potentially chilling even offerings that should not be integrated.2 55
It increases the legal costs of issuers because issuers are more likely to
need legal advice and because it is harder for lawyers to predict the SEC's
position.256 It increases the possibility of mistakes by the SEC staff in
particular cases and also the cost of administering the integration doc-
trine.257 Thus, although the five factors are relevant to the economic anal-
ysis of integration, using them may cost more than they are worth.
More certain rules, such as the integration safe harbors, could be un-
derinclusive or overinclusive. 258 They might fail to integrate offerings in
which registration is efficient, or they might require integration in cases in
which registration is inefficient. But the gains associated with more certain
251 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (and Others) Under Regulation D:
Those Nagging Problems That Need Attention, 74 Ky. L.J. 127, 164 (1985-1986). Accord, Commit-
tee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Integration of Securities Offerings: Report of the Task Force
on Integration, 41 Bus. LAw. 595, 623 (1986); Wade, supra note 202, at 222; Wallace, supra note
249, at 940. "In a number of no-action letters, a single criterion established in the release has taken
precedence over the remaining four." Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, supra, at 623.
"Additionally, the SEC staff and the courts have rendered interpretations of the integration doctrine
that appear to invoke factors other than" the five listed. Wallace, supra note 249, at 940.
'12 Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations, Integration of Part-
nership Offerings: A Proposal for Identifying a Discrete Offering, 37 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1605 (1982);
Wade, supra note 202, at 221; Wallace, supra note 249, at 958.
' Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations, supra note 252, at
1605.
I" Wallace, supra note 249, at 989.
2 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 21, at 262-63; Kaplow, supra note 21, at 605.
2 See Kaplow, supra note 21, at 569-71.
... See Diver, supra note 21, at 74; Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 21, at 266-67.
'38 See Diver, supra note 21, at 73; Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 21, at 268.
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rules-reducing the risk to issuers and the other costs of impreci-
sion-could outweigh the costs associated with underinclusiveness or over-
inclusiveness, especially because the application of the five-factor test ap-
pears so imprecise and inconsistent. 59
4. The Integration of a Deference Offering and Another Offering
The economics of deciding whether to integrate two deference offerings
is similar to that for two small offerings. If the deference exemptions ap-
ply, the total benefit of registration for either offering alone260 is less than
the total cost of registration for that offering: TB, < TC, and TB2 <
TC2. If there are economies of scale in registering the two offerings to-
gether, then the total cost of registering the two offerings together is less
than the sum of the costs of registering the two offerings separately: TC() +
2) < TC1 + TC,. Because the benefits of registration are roughly additive,
the total benefit of registering the two offerings together is the sum of the
benefits of registering either offering separately: TB( + 2) = TBI + TB2.
Because TB1 < TC and TB2 < TC2, we know that TB, + TB2 < TC,
+ TC2. However, because TC(J + 2) < TC, + TC2, one cannot determine
mathematically whether the benefit of registering the combined offering,
TB(1 + 2), is greater or less than the cost, TCl + 2)" The answer to this
question depends on the same factors discussed with respect to the integra-
tion of two small offerings.
However, the deference exemptions have no dollar limit: no matter how
large a deference offering is, it is still exempted. As with the sophisticated
offeree exemptions, the lack of a limit on the amount of the offering is
efficient only if, for each additional dollar, the marginal cost of registra-
tion always exceeds the marginal benefit. 261 But, if this is true, integration
should never destroy a deference exemption. Adding these marginal costs
and benefits to the costs and benefits of registering some other offering can
259 Given the difficulty in calculating the costs and benefits of registration, it is impossible to
determine if the SEC's application of the five-factor test in any given no-action letter is economically
correct. However, if, as many critics have argued, the SEC's interpretations are inconsis-
tent-dissimilar results in similar cases-it is certain that at least some of those interpretations are
incorrect.
... The total benefits and costs are, of course, the incremental benefits and costs of SEC regula-
tion, assuming that the alternative regulator is acting.
261 See supra text accompanying note 169.
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never produce an economic gain. Thus, the same argument made for the
sophisticated offeree exemptions26 2 applies to the deference exemptions. If
the absence of a dollar limit is efficient, integration should never eliminate
a deference exemption.
5. The Treatment of Isolated Sales
The analysis above should make it apparent that single, isolated sales of
a small dollar amount should not affect whether a separate, larger offer-
ing is exempted. Consider first a small offering exemption. Assume, for
example, that an issuer makes an offering which qualifies for exemption
under Rule 505. Shortly thereafter, the same issuer sells $500 worth of
the same security to a single purchaser in a transaction that does not qual-
ify for Rule 505. Should that single sale be integrated with the Rule 505
offering to destroy the Rule 505 exemption? From a cost-benefit stand-
point, the answer is usually no.
For the Rule 505 exemption to be justified for the large offering, the
total benefit of registration must be less than the total cost. Combining the
single $500 sale and the Rule 505 offering is unlikely to affect substan-
tially the calculation of net benefits. Factoring in the $500 sale will
change a negative net benefit of registration to a positive net benefit only if
the extra $500 pushes the offering above the $5 million cap (assuming
that $5 million is the point at which registration becomes efficient). If that
is the case, then registration should be required. But the integration doc-
trine is not needed to produce this result. The concept of aggregation suf-
fices: the isolated sale should be considered in calculating the dollar
amount available under Rule 505. In deciding whether registration should
be required, the fact that the isolated sale does not meet other require-
ments of Rule 505 is irrelevant.
VI. CONCLUSION
The economic model developed in this Article provides a lens through
which to view the transaction exemptions in the Securities Act. With that
lens, one is able to analyze the economics of the registration requirement
and the exemptions from that requirement. The model shows why small
282 See supra part V.C.2.
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offering, sophisticated offeree, and deference exemptions could be efficient,
and why certain features of the current exemptions are problematic.
The analysis provided by the model is useful, but incomplete. The
model leaves several important questions unanswered: What exactly
should the dollar limit of the small offering exemptions be? What disclos-
ure should be required for the intermediate disclosure exemptions? Who
should be considered sophisticated? To what other regulators should the
SEC defer? Better empirical data would allow us to answer some of these
remaining questions; others are likely always to turn on educated guesses,
given the difficulty of measuring things like the benefits of registration.
In brief, the model developed here offers a starting point-a map to-
wards further empirical work and an invitation to further refinements.
The model takes us a long way toward understanding the transaction ex-
emptions in the Securities Act, but further work is needed.
